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1INTRODUCTION
G. E. Moore claimed that by gesturing with his hand and saying,
"Here is a hand," he could prove that external objects exist. Against
the claims of traditional philosophers, who so often seem to contradict
common sense, Moore hold that the common sense view of the world is, in
its fundamental features, true; that the beliefs of common sense are, for
the most part, beliefs which we all know to be true. Many of Moore's
critics feel that traditional philosophical positions cannot be so abrupt-
ly countered; and some believe that philosophical statements, or arguments,
are not what toey seem to be, Moore’s included. Philosophical views which
go against common sense have been interpreted as assertions that certain
ordinary expressions do not make sense, or as proposals that certain ex-
pressions should not be used, or should not be used in the ways they are
ordinarily used. Moore has been understood to be pointing out situations
in which these expressions do have a use and make sense so as to refute
the traditional philosopher or to advise against his proposal.
I will attempt to show that those interpretations, both of tradi-
tional philosophy and of Moore’s philosophy, are mistaken. I will also
formulate a metaphilosophical thesis, with the purpose of clarifying the
relationship between Moore’s philosophy and traditional philosophies.
This paper contains two main sections. In the first part, I will
examine Moore’s views on philosophy and on ordinary language, and his de-
fense of common sense. I will show 1) that Moore believes that very often
philosophers contradict or go beyond common sense, or do both; 2) that
Moore’s appeals to ordinary language are preliminary to his defense of
2common sense and that the one must be clearly distinguished from tho other;
3) that Moore defends common sense by noting inconsistencies in the denial
of the common sense view and by claiming that the beliefs of common sense
are certainly true and more certain than philosophical principles; 4) that
Moore’s defense does not necessarily involve the claim that common sense
beliefs are known without need of evidence (which he sometimes hold) and
is compatible with the view that we do need and do have evidence for
them (which he sometimes held). In essence, Moore's philosophy is a demon-
stration that we can make common sense our touchstone without committing
any philosophical errors.
In the second part of this paper, I will examine the views of
Moore’s critics. Some critics argue that Moore’s proof of an external
world and the sceptical position it was intended to refute are not, as
they seem to be, empirical. They believe that philosophical statements
are not empirical because no empirical evidence is, or can be, given for
or against thorn. I will note that philosophers do often appeal to em-
pirical evidence and will examine the nature of this appeal. One cri-
tic argues that philosophical statements are not empirical because philo-
sophical categories are not general names; any statement of the form "x
is a
_
” in which ” is a category, has its truth and sig-
nificance range the same. Tills peculiarity, it is said, shows that cer-
tain statements involving categories are not empirical, I will argue
that this is not a peculiarity of all philosophical categories, and in
particular not of those which Moore’s defense of common sense involves.
Some traditional philosophers have believed that their conclusions are
necessary statements, not empirical. This view, as one of Moore’s cri-
tics has shown, involves the traditional philosopher in an inconsistency.
3Some critics argue that philosophical statements, Moore’s in-
cluded, are verbal in import or that they inform us about ordinary lan-
guage, I will show that the first view is mistaken and the second im-
plausible. The related view, that any statement which violates ordinary
language as false, is also mistaken. Some critics atterr.pt to show that
P^^'0S0P^ 1 ^-ca~‘- statements are really linguistic proposals. X will trv to
clarify tnis view and argue that it, too, is implausible. The related
view that, if philosophers are making linguistic proposals, their pro-
posals are useless, is also mistaken.
Finally, I vail propose a metaphilos ophical theory which clar-
ifies the relationship between Moore’s philosophy and traditional philos—
ophy. My view is tnat philosophers often use special criteria by which
to judge whether certain items belong to certain categories. Moore has
shown that good philosophy can be done with the ordinary criteria.
4PART I
MOORE ON PHILOSOPHY, COMMON SENSE AND ORDIiiARY LANGUAGE
CHAPTER I
MOORE’S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY
5
A. Common Sense
.
Russell had invited me to tea in his rooms to
meet KcTaggart; and McTaggart, in the course of
conversation had been led to express his well-
known view that Time is unreal. This must have
seemed to me then (as it still does) a perfectly
monstrous proposition, and I did my best to argue
against it... And I think this example is also typ-
ical of what (if I am not mistaken) has always been
with me, the main stimulus to philosophize.'"
This is Moore speaking, in his autobiography. Presumably,
McTaggart ’s view struck Moore, then in his second year at Cambridge, as
"perfectly monstrous" because it seemed to go against common sense. This
is not an unusual response to a philosophical, thesis. Often people are
dismayed by philosophers' theses, and usually because they seem to go
against common sense, and are
,
in this sense, paradoxical. They seem to
go against what everybody, or almost everybody, believes.
Throughout his career, Moors continued to believe that, often,
philosophers' theories did go against common sense; that a large portion
of philosophical 1iterator's constituted a long and continuous attack on
1G. £. Moore, "Autobiography," Paul A. Schilpp, ed. , The Phi-
losophy of G._ E. Moore (Evanston; Northwestern University, 1942),
pp. 13-14.
6common senso. Moore's
fense of common sense.
career as a philosopher is, in large part, a de-
Ard his belief that philosophy and common sense
are so often in conflict forms the backbone of his philosophical style.
Moore recognised that the intuition that philosophical the-
ories go against common sense needs precise formulation. First, what-
does it mean to say that a certain item is a feature of the common sense
view of the world? Moore answers
,
Something like this: That it is a thing which
every or very nearly every sane adult, who has the use
of all his senses
.believes or knows,,.Does one need
to add; And of which, for many centuries, it would have
been true to say this?'*'
Let us call thic?, with A. R. White, the criterion of universal
2
acceptance. This criterion is the only one which needs to be satisfied
in order for a statement to be a common sense statement. The question
which Moore asks above indicates that what is included in the common
sense view of the world changes from time to time. Elsewhere, Moore
assert-, explicitly, that the views of common sense change as we progress
in knowledge. At one time, people believed that the heavenly bodies wore
small, compared to the earth, and at comparatively short distances from
the earth. But now these primitive views are rejected. ,rV/e should say
that we know they wore wrong; we have discovered that they were wrong;
and the discovery is part of our progress in knowledge.” let while there
^G. E. Moore, Commonplace Book, Casimer Lewy, ed, (New York:
The Macmillan Co., Humanities press, Inc., 1962), p. 280.
^A. R. White, G_. E._ Moore
,
A Critical Exposition (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 11.
?sro those examples of change in the common sense view, there are beliefs
of common sense which, as far as we know, have not changed, e. E „ that
there are a great number of material objects in the Universe. 1 Simply
the face that a belief is part of the common sense view does not prove
that the belief is a true one. 2 Further human experience and science
often show beliefs of common sense to be false.
Common sense dees not have a view on everything; nor does the
common-sense view of the world amount to a complete theory about the whole
universe. Moore says, Ido not know that common sense can be said to have
any views about the whole universe; none of its views, perhaps, amount- to
this. Common sense does not havo a view about whether or not there is
a God or an aftei* life. While an enormous number of people believe that
there is a God, many people do not; it is not s. belief which, now commands
universal acceptance.
There are certain characteristics which many belief's of common
sense share, though these characteristics are not criteria for a belief's
being part of the common sense view of the world, Moore has drawn atten-
tion to the fact that many of those beliefs are habitually accepted, the
fact that certain kinds of inconsistencies flow from denying various com-
mon sense beliefs, and the fact that many beliefs of common sense seem
obviously to be true.-5 Another peculiarity of a number of items of tho
^G. E. Moore, S ome Main Problems of Philosophy (New York;
Collier Books, 1962), pp. 15-l6T~
O
A. R. White, onA cit. . p. 12.
^Some Main Problems of Philosophy
, p. 14. After their first-
citation, Moore’s works will be cited by title.
^Jbtd
.
, pp. 30-31.
-*A. R. White, op. cit, , pp. 12-15.
8common sense view is that what one of us believes when he believes a par-
ticular item of the common sense view is not identical with what another
of us believes when he believes the same item. This is because these
items are beliefs about oneself. When S believes, "My body exists," he
does not believe what R believes when R believes, "My body exists." Thus,
the common sense view is not merely a collection of propositions
.
1
The common sense view of the world, then, consists of what each
of us believes in common with very nearly everyone else. This view of the
world is not simply a collection of propositions. Nor is it a complete
theory about the whole universe. Nor, according to Moore, is this view
necessarily completely correct. It has changed from time to time, as we
have progressed in knowledge. Yet, Moore maintains, th9 common sense
view of the world is, in its fundamental features, certainly true.
B. Conflict Between Philosophy and Common Sense
.
According to Moore, the important kinds of questions with which
philosophy deals are:
(1) Questions about the meaning of voids, phrases and
forms of expression: Analysis;
(2) Questions about Reality as a whole;
(3) A number of questions about human knowledge;
w Still mors questions about what it’s reasonable for
us to believe and in what degree .^
I will not discuss, in this paper, Moore's conception of analysis. It is
inot clear from his writings what, if any, relation he thought to hold
^Commonplace Book
, p. 280.
2
G. E. Moore, IebJtur£5. EhjljBaoaabz, Casimer Levy, ed.
(New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 19o6), p. 190.
9between common sense beliefs and philosophical analysis. But I think it
is reasonable to assume that he believed that common sense does not have
a view about whether any particular analysis is correct cr not.
Moore uses the expressions, "Reality as a whole" and "the
Universe as a whole," interchangeably. Moore’s examples of statements about
the universe as a whole are statements about what is in the universe or
occurs in it. Mooie believes that it is fair to include as questions about
tuo universe ao a whole, questions o.f the third, and perhaps the fourth,
kino, questions aoout what vie know with certainty to be in the universe, 4 ’
sr.d questions about wnat it is reasonable to believe is in the universe
.
Thus, Moore thought that the most important and interesting thing which
philosophers do is:
To give a general description of the whole of the Universe,
mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know
to be in it, considering how far it is likely that there are in
it important kinds of things which we do not absolutely know to
be in it, and also considering the most important ways in which
these various kinds of things are related to one another.
^
For Moore, philosophy seems to bo a special sort of inventory of the uni-
verse, special because it is concerned with the mos t Important kinds of
things which are in the universe and because philosophers discuss their
questions "by a particular method." While the sciences do not "raise these
^Lectures on Philosophy
,
p. 175.
2Ibid
.
. pp. 181-2.
^Some Main Problems of Philosophy
,
p. 13
«
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abstract questions themselves, •< they do raise and settle questions from
which answers to the philosophical questions follow. What distinguishes
philosophy from science is its abstractness, and, primarily, its method. 1
What interested Moore most about philosophy was the fact that
it so often went against common sense and science.
What is most amazing and most interesting about the
views of many philosophers, is the way In which they go be-
yond or positively contradict the views of Common Sense...
You will best realize what these philosophical descriptions
of the Universe really mean by realizing how very different
they are from the views of Common Sense. 2
Tne fact that philosophy so often seems to go against common sense is not
a fact which Moore discovered, and perhaps for most people this fact is
the most interesting fact about philosophy. What is special about Moore
is that the initial shock and the initial feeling that philosophers must
be wrong never wore off; nor did his conviction that philosophers were
indeed contradicting common sense.
Among the beliefs of common sense, according to Moore, are the
beliefs that there are in the universe both material objects and mental
acts, that mental acts are attached to some bodies but not to others, that
mental acts are dependent upon changes which occur in our bodies, that mat-
ter is independent of our consciousness of it, that all material objects
^Lectures on Philosophy, p. 1?8.
some Main Problems of Philos ophy , p. 14,
end mental acts are in time, and that we know all of these things. 1
Thes® beliefs meet the criterion of universal acceptance; they are
items in the common sense view of the world. But these and the other
items in the common sense view of the world do not constitute a general
description of the whole of the universe. Common sense does not say
that those are the only kinds of things in the universe, or that we know
to be in it; nor, even, that there may be other kinds. Common sense, by
itself, is not a philosophical theory. In order to convert the common
sense beliefs into a general description of the whole universe, "we
should have to add one or other of two things ..
.
either : Everything in
the Universe.
. .is either a material object in space, or an act of con-
sciousness .. .Or else we might say; Everything which we know to be in
the Universe does belong to one or other of these two classes; though
there may be in the Universe other things which we do not know to be in
2 oit."' Moore believes that the first viewJ is plausible, "at least as
plausible as many that have been proposed by philosophers," that the
second view is still more plausible,^ and that the second view, modified
so that it mentions the unsubstantial kinds of things, is the correct view.
But many philosophers have held that any such vievj as
this is very incorrect indeed. And different philosophers have
held it to be incorrect in three different ways. They have
^5 erne Main Problems of Philosophy
, pp. 15-25
•
2
Ibid., p. 2?.
^V/ith the proviso that acts of consciousness may belong to beings
on other planets as well as on the earth.
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either held that there certainly are in the Universe some
most important kinds of things—substantial kinds of things—
ill to those which Common Sense asserts to be in it.
Or else they have positively contradicted Common Sense: have
asserted that some of the things which Common Sense supposes
to be in it, are not in it, or else, that, if they are, we
do not know it. Or else they have dona both
; both added and
contradicted.^'
Three examples of additions to common sense are the views that there is a
God, that there is an after-life, and that there is something in the uni-
verse besides material objects and acts of consciousness, but we do not
know what it is. Many people do believe that there is a God and that there
is an after-life, but many people believe that we do not know whether or not
thei e is a aod or an after-life, so that it is fairest to say that common
sense has no view on these points.^ Other views which go beyond common
sense are the views that there are an infinite number of attributes besides
extension and thought, that this is the best of all possible worlds, and per-
haps that every change has a caused The two main varieties of views which
do not add to but do contradict common sense are, first, the variety which
asserts that we do not know that there are material objects, and second,
the variety which denies that we can know of the existence of any minds be-
sides our own/r Also, if a philosopher merely denied that there are
1
S ome Main Problems of Philosophy, pp. 29-30 ,
2
Ibid_._, pp. 30-31.
^Lectures on Philosophy, pp. 174, 180.
^Somo Main Problems of Philosophy
, p. 32.
13
material objects without adding that, e.g., there is a God, he also would
bo contradicting without adding to common sense. Finally, the third way
in which philosophers’ views have gone against common sense, that of both
adding to and contradicting common sense, includes a number of types.
Berkloy be oh adcied that there is a God and denied that there are material
oojt-cts. Berkley claimed that he did not deny that there are material ob-
ject:-, but ho also held that what he called material objects exist only
when we see them and are not all in the same space. "I think, then, it
may fairly be said that Berkley denies the existence of any material ob-
jects, in the sense in which Common Sense asserts their existence."^
Other views deny the existence of material objects and assert the exis-
tence of an immense number of minds, in addition to those of men and ani-
mals, claiming also that these minds are not in space. 2 And still other
philosophers have denied that material objects, our own acts of conscious-
ness, time, and space dc really exist; rather they are appearances of
something else, a collection of different minds, one mind, or something
which is in some sense mental or spiritual, but not one or many minds.
3
Mooro's picture of traditional philosophy is of a discipline
which through special methods has consistently and literally denied the
existence of--or denied knowledge of the existence of—kinds or classes
of things which are almost universally believed to exist, and has often
asserted the existence of certain things which are not universally be-
lieved to exist or are very rarely believed to exist. For Moore, the
^3ome Main Problem s of Philosophy , p, 32.
2Ibid
.
,
p. 35
•
3Ibid.
,
pp. 35”3?
•
goes
moot striking thing about traditional philosophy is the fact that it
beyond and/or contradicts common sense. Historically, there has been a
continuing conflict of claims between philosophy and common sense.
And the sane is true for philosophy and the special sciences.
Philosophers who have discussed what philosophy is have often attempted
to give a definition which will ensure that no question discussed by
philosophy will be identical with any discussed by the sciences. But
Moore claims that while the sciences do not raise abstract questions,
such as, "Is Matter Real?," they do "raise and settle questions from which
one particular answer to them follows ; " thus, "it seems to me obviously
rather a subterfuge to say that in raising them it is raising questions
wnich the sciences don't raise." Though a philosopher does not talk a~
bout the stars, if he comes to the conclusion that there are no material
objects, he is contradicting the astronomers; 1 he is contradicting the
scientific conclusion that there were once on the earth "large numbers
of enormous reptiles, ichthyosauri and such like."2 Science is closely
related to common sense. The sciences "give us detailed knowledge about
particular oojccts of the kinds which I have been trying to define," name-
ly those kinds of things which common sense says are in the universe,
"Mcs t of the special sciences confine themselves to some particular group
among objects of these.
. .kinds ; and we believe that they have been very
successful in giving us a great deal of real knowledge about objects of
these kinds."-' Each of the natural sciences gives us detailed knowledge
1
Lectures on Philosophy
, p. 178 .
2
Ibid . , p. 177.
-
'Some Main Problems of philosophy, p. 25.
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about certain kinds of material objects. History and biography give us
knowledge about the actions of different men or collections of men am
theii aces of consciousness. Psychology is concerned with the mental
acts which we perform.
In the case of all these sciences, there are, we
believe, an immense number of things which are now defi-
nitely known to be facts; a great many v.’hich were formerly
believec, but are now definitely known to be errors; and
a great many which we do not know and perhaps never shall
know. In all cur ordinary ‘talk, in all newspapers and in
all ordinary books (by which X mean books other than phil-
osophical books) we constantly assume that there is this
distinction between what we know, what we wrongly believe,
and what we are still in ignorance about...All this is, I
think, certainly nowadays part of the belief of Common
Sense about the Universe.^
Moore’s position is that it is part of the common sense view
that certain kinds of objects exist, and that science gives us detailed
knowledge about these kinds of objects, material things and mental acts.
That these sorts of things exist is a consequence of scientific conclu-
sions. What is amazing and most interesting for Moore is the fact that
traditional philosophies very often contradict and/or go beyond both com-
mon sense and the sciences.
^Some Main Problems of Philosophy
,
p. 25.
CHAPTER II
COMMON sense and ordinary language
16
Moore's numerous romarks about language are scattered throughout
his writings. Here I do not attempt to give a full account of Moore's views
on language, but only to mention a few of his views which are especially
relevant to the second part of this paper.
First, I wish to repeat a point noted by A. R. White in his book
on Moore. White claims that Norman Malcolm and others have confused Moore’s
appeals to common sense with his appeals to ordinary language. While empha-
sizing, on the one hand, that the philosophical statements which Moore at-
tempts to refute go against common sense, Malcolm claims, on the other hand,
that the essence of Moore's technique consists in his pointing out that these
statements "go against ordinary language."1 In another article, Malcolm at-
tempts to show that there is something wrong with Moore's defense of common
sense by trying to show that he is really defending a queer use of language.
Malcolm says, "Moore's assertions do not belong to 'common sense,' i.e., to
ordinary language, at all." 2 White says,
Moore's recourse to ordinary language .is mainly in-
tended to discover what a philosopher's view comes to when
put into ... ordinary language, and to indicate what in fact
are the beliefs of common sense by referring to what we all
ordinarily say. Having established what is the philosophical
view and what the common sense view and the two conflict, he
1
Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Schilpp, op.
cit., p. 3*1-9.
2Norman Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense," The Philosophical
Review, LVIII (19^9).
17
can c-hon use tho appeal to the latter to refute the
former.^
Moore's translations into the concrete are not intended to show that phil-
osophical views go against ordinary usage, but rather that they go against
common sense. Moore uses the fact that they go against common sense to show
that they are false. For Moore, the correctness of language and the truth-
value of a statement must be distinguished. "Thus using a sentence correct-
ly—in the sense explained (in accordance with the best English usage)—and
Uoing it in such a way that what you mean by it is true
,
are two things which
ere completely logically independent of one another..."2
Still, Moore often aid castigate philcsphers for using words in absurd
or improper ways
. Moore often notes that philosophers have used "material
object" or "real" in such a way that denying that material objects exist or
are real does not involve denying the existence of blackboards and loaves of
bread. Some have defined "material object" as an object which is independent
of perception. Moore says, "I think myself that such usage is absurd and un-
justifiable. It seems to me a separate question whether material things are
real* and whether they're independent of perception." Other philosophers
seem tc- say that "That is a blackboard" entails "That's not a colony of mo-
nads." Moore says, "I say my sense is the right one, and the others are
wrong and improper senses; but even if they're right, they're certainly dif-
ferent."^ Moore does not say that the usage is absurd shows the proposition
^A. R. White, on. cit. , p. 7.
2G. E. Moore, "Reply to His Critics," Sehilpp, op. cit.
^Lectures on Philos ophy, pp. 16-17
.
18
to be false. He is most concerned to emphasize that he is not using "mate-
rial object" and "real" in the ways that some other philosophers have used
them. The wisdom of this concern will become apparent in the second part
of this paper where I note that some philosophers have found it difficult
to believe that Moore is doing what he seems to be doing. When Moore asserts.
"Here is a hand; therefore there are material objects," we might be tempted
to believe that Moore is being less than candid, if we have not been fore-
warned that Moore's use of words conforms to ordinary usage and certain
philosophical uses do not.
Sometimes Moore dismisses a philosophical view as a mere abuse of
language. Discussing freewill, he says that some philosophe 2\s seem to hold
that "our will can properly be said to be free even if we never can, in any
sense at all do anything else, except what, in the end, we actually do do.
But th.uS view, if it is held, seems to me to be plainly a mere abuse of lan-
guage,"^- Note that Moore is not dismissing either the view that we have
freewill or the view that we do not have freewill, but a view about under
what conditions we can properly be said to have freewill. Perhaps Moore
could have made more use of this argument than he actually does. For exam-
ple, he could have similarly argued that some philosophers seem to hold that
we can properly be said to know something only if we can prove it; but this
view is a "mere abuse of language," Yet often Moore does not argue in the
"linguistic mode." Rather he claims that he can know something which he can-
not prove. ^ Or, he clarifies what he is claiming, e.g., that we know that
^G. E. Moore, Ethics (London, 1912), pp. 202-3.
^G. E. Moore, Phil
o
s ophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1962)*
p. I'i8.
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there are material objects, partly by distinguishing his assertion from the
assertion of another philosopher, say Berkley, who he believes is using
vords in an improper manner. Clearly, Moore did not believe that all para-
doxical philosophical claims could be countered with an abuse
-of-language
argument. For, as shall be seen below, he believed that some philosophers
had made paradoxical assertions such as “Material objects do net exist" and
"We do not know that material objects exist," using these expressions in the
"proper" way. And it is these assertions which Moore attempts to refute in
his defense of common sense.
Moore believed tha.t in general philosophical expressions are am-
biguouo and ordinary expressions are not. When he uses a philosophical ex-
pression, he is very concerned about clarifying how he is using it and dis-
tinguishing his use from others. He is rarely concerned with clarifying on
ordinary expression and distinguishes understanding such an expression from
giving its analysis. An ordinary terra may be, in a sense, vague. Was the
body of the "missing link" a human body? At what point does an embryo be-
come a human body? At what point does a corpse cease to be a human body?
The difficulty of answering such questions shows that "human body" is, in a
sons©, ambiguous . ^ But in most cases, we do understand what is meant by
"human body." "There isn't any ambiguity about the term 'human body,' in
the sense in which there is about 'material thing' or 'physical object."'
The special ambiguity of "material object" arises from the fact that phi-
losophers have used the term in different senses; they have not done this
^Moore uses the expression "in a. sense, ambiguous." Strictly,
the issue in question is one of vagueness . Ordinary expressions are some-
times vague, philosophical expressions often ambiguous
.
Vith "human body .
-
1
Moore believes that to can define "material thing- in
the way that he is using it, by saying that if there are human bodies, chairs,
etc., then there certainly are material bodies. Ke believes
-that there cer-
tainly is one proper use of... 'material thing '.. .which is such that a person
vho says 'there are human bodies, but there are no material things' is con-
tradicting himself, just as would be a person who said.
.. 'There are grey-
hounds, but there are no dogs .'-2 Moore's definition is not arbitrary; he
does not believe he is making "Human bodies are material things- an expression
for a necessary proposition, but that there is one proper use of -material
body accoraing to which this statement is_ a necessary statement. If this
is the case, then it follows that if there are human bodies or hands, etc.,
then there are material objects. If -human body," "hand," "chair," etc.,
are, in a sense, not ambiguous, then, it seems to Moore, his definition of
•mateiial thing" is ' really clear with the sort of clearness that is wanted
in philosophy.
For Moore, if a philosophical assertion is ambiguous, we should
attempt to discover what is really being said and then see whether or not
it is reasonable to believe what is really being said. Ue can dismiss a
philosophical claim as a mere abuse of language only if it, as the asser-
tion about freewill, completely hangs on an improper use of language. In
his defense of common sense, Moore is first concerned with clarifying what
he means to claim by 'Material objects do exist." Then, he concerns him-
self with denying that there are good reasons to believe that, e.g., every
'Lectures on Philosophy
, pp. 17-18 .
2
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physical fact is logically dependent upon sons mental fact. 1 The latter
proposition is o.no which some philosophers have probably meant to assert
by "Material objects do not exist." For Moore, their assertions cannot bo
refuted by pointing out their ambiguity, nor can they be refuted with an
abuse-of-language argument. What they really meant must be dealt with as
veil as what they said (i.e., how they expressed themselves). If „ philos-
opher uses "material object" in a way such that "Human bodies are material
o-jocus" is not a necessary statement, he cannot be refuted by a claim that
he is misusing language (although he is). Rather, for Moore, a refutation
involves ascertaining what a philosopher's position really is and consider-
ing whether or not it is a reasonable view. White suras up Moore's method:
Inconsistencies with ordinary use mark s philosophical
doctrine as incorrectly expressed, misleading, and maybe ab-
surd; inconsistencies with the beliefs of common sense mark
it a.> false.
. .Finally* if t. pliilos opher *
s
Vj.ews, when clearly
understood, are found consistent with the beliefs of common
sense, they are to be sccepted as true.^
Phil o s oph 1 Ceil. Papers t pp
.
2
A. R. White
,
op. pit, , p.
39 , 45 .
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CHAPTER III
DEFENDING COMMON SENSE
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A. The I^uistic Preliminaries
. In the preceding sections I
have stated that Moore believed that philosophical positions often contra-
dict or go beyond common sense; that philosophical statements are often
ambiguous; that ordinary expressions are, in a sense, not ambiguous; and
that whether or not a proposition is true is independent of whether or not
it is correctly expressed. These beliefs form the framework for Moore's
defense of common sense. He first claims that he knows for certain a num-
ber of cu. on sense statements (not all) and that these statements are not
ambiguous. He then notes that some philosophers have held doctrines which
contradict these common sense statements. He emphasizes the fact that the
philosophical statements are ambiguous and is very concerned to make clear
that he means to refute these statements as they are most properly under-
stood, i.e., as contradicting common sense. Finally, he turns from lin-
guistic matters to considerations which are intended to at least incline
one to believe that the philosophical statements are false and the common
sense statements true. Let us examine Moore's defense.
Moore begins with a long list of propositions, all of which, he
says, "I know with certainty to be true."
There exists at present a living human body, which is my
body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and
has existed continuously ever since, though not without under-
going changes; it was, for instance, much smaller when it was
born, and for some time afterwards, than it is now..."*'
^G. E. Moore, "Defence of Common Sense," Philosophical Papers ,
p. 33.
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So the list begins. And it goes on and on and on. Next, Moore claims that
"very many (I do not say all)" human beings have known propositions corres-
ponding to those in his list; i.o., not only does Moore know that there now
exists his body, but he also knows that, ssy, Russell, Ramsey, and Wittgen-
stein each knows respectively that his body now exists, that the earth has
existed for many years, and so on. "Each of us" knows all these "truisms.
"
1
Mooi e acknowledges that some philosophers have used the expressions
in his list to express propositions which they are not ordinarily understood
to express, perhaps to express related propositions which these philosophers
take to be true. "I wish, therefore, to make it quite plain that I was not
using the expression I used (in ray list) in any such subtle sense. Al-
though Moore does not give any examples, we may presume that any philosopher
who uses "My body exists" to express a proposition about appearances or mo-
nads is using this expression in just such a "subtle sense." Moore acknowl-
edges that some philosophers "are capable of disputing" his assumption that
there is a meaning which is "the ordinary or popular meaning" of the state-
ments in his list.
They seem to think that the question "Do you believe
that the earth has existed for many years past?" is not a
plain question such as should be met either by a plain "Yes"
or "No," or by a plain "1 can't make up my mind," but is the
sort of question which can be properly met by: "It all de-
pends on what you mean by ‘the earth’ and ’exists’ and ’years.’
'""Defence of Common Sense," Philosophical Papers , p. 3^»
^Ibid._, p. 3^.
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If you nean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then
I do; but if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so,
or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so,
and so and so, and so and so, then I don't, or at least I
think io is extremely doubtful," It seems to me that such
o. view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can be."^
Moore does noc mean to assert that all expressions have only one
meaning or that tm-re are no cases in which we should have trouble applying
an ordinary expression. As noted above, "human body" is, in a certain sense,
ambiguous
. Moore's point is that the statement, "My body exists," is not am-
biguous, perhaps not even in the sense that the term "body" is. (Although
we can imagine the case of Dracula ; if there v;ere a vampire, "the living
dead," unreflected by mirrors, etc., could he truthfully say, "There exists
at present a living human body, which is my body"?J Or, if Christ was a
God-Man could he say it? before the crucifixion? after it? What if the
"missing link" could speak? Could he say it?) Moore believes that each ex-
pression in his list "is the very type of an unambiguous expression, the mean-
ing of which we all understand." As far as I know, Moore never attempts any
more precise formulation of the sense in which ordinary expressions are not
ambiguous; we all understand them. If a philosopher disputes this, Moore
believes that he must be confusing the question whether we understand the
meaning of such an expression with the question whether we can give a cor-
rect analysis of its meaning. Moore's comments do not suggest that
^
"Defence of Common Sense," Philos ophical Papers
, pp, 36-3?
•
2Ibid . t p. 37.
•^Ibid
.
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philosophers who have used ordinary expressions in "subtle senses have,
A2so facto, uttered falsehoods. Rather, Moore’s comments suggest merely
that their practice nay be illegitimate and the result of confusion.
In contrast to the unambiguous statements in Moore’s list, there
is a group of expressions popular among philosophers which are "really am-
biguous," namely, "Material things are not real," "Space is not real,"
’Tine is not real," and "The Self is not real," Moore acknowledges that
some philosophers nay have used these expressions to express views which
are not incompatible with Moore’s truisms and his cover-statement that each
of us knows the truisms.
With such philosophers, if there are any, I am not,
of course, at present concerned. But it seems to me that
the most natural and proper usage of each of theso expres-
sions is a. usage in which it doe s express a view incompatible
with (the cover-statement that each of us knows the truisms);
and in the case of each of them, seme philosophers have, I
think, really used the expression in question to express such
a vie;). All such philosophers have, therefore, been holding a
view incompatible with (mine )
Thus far, Moore has been concerned primarily with making his position clear*
The points which he makes after enunciating his truisms are linguistic, hav-
ing to do with the ambiguity or lack of ambiguity of expressions and the
logical relations between the propositions he takes to be expressed by
certain expressions. He wishes to make very clear that in the way that he
is using the expressions, "My body exists" and "Material things are not real"
1
"Defence of Common Sense," Philosophi cal Papers , p. 39*
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are incompatible, that he knows the former to be true anc that at least
some philosophers have asserted the latter. In all of this, we have nothing
except Moore’s testimony which should incline us to either of the two incom-
patible views. The linguistic remarks are preliminary. We have a similar
state of affairs in Moore’s ’'Proof of the External World," in which a long
preliminary section is also devoted to clarifying what is at issue,
^
B. Ilico^istencies . Moore proceeds to note certain inconsisten-
cies which arise when the beliefs of common sense are denied. First, if, in
fact, any philos ocncr nas denied tne statements in Moore’s list (by claiming,
e.g., that material oojects are not real), it follows (simply from the fact
that he has denied them) that he must bo mistaken. "For when I speak of
’philosophers’ 1 mean of course (as we all do) exclusively philosophers who
have been human beings with human bodies that have lived upon the earth,.."2
if, as Moore believes, what some philosophers have meant by, say, "Material
objects are not real," is incompatible with what each of us believes when he
believes, "My body exists," then what the philosopher denies, in effect, is
that he (his body) exists. Put to say that a philosopher has denied it is to
imply that the philosopher ( cum body) has existed. To say that a philosopher
has denied the common-sense beliefs is, ipso facto, tc contradict the philos-
opher
.
Secondly, philosophers have often expressed views inconsistent with
their philosophical views. They have betrayed this inconsistency by alluding
to the existence of other philosophers and the human race, often by use of the
^
Philosophica l Papers
,
pp. 126-144.
2
Ibid. t p. 38.
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pronoun, ,!we
philosophers
true.
Moore doss not find this surprising because he believos that
like everyone else, know the common sense propositions to be
The strange thing is that philosophers should have been
able to hold sincerely, as part of their philosophical creed,
propositions inconsistent with what they themselves knew to be
true; and yet, so far as 1 can make out, this has really fre-
quently happened.-*
What Moore thinks is strange but true, Lazerowitz called a paradox and could
2
not accept. It involves the consequence (assuming that knowledge entails
belief) that philosophers have held contradictory beliefs. A philosopher
faced with this accusation might attempt to defend himself; most likely his
defense would concern his use of language, either philosophical, or ordinary,
or both. Moore would have to maintain his position that at least soma phi-
losophers have indeed hold common sense beliefs inconsistent with their philo-
sophical beliefs ; that the inconsistency is not merely apparent and due to the
expressions used.
Filially, philosophers who deny, not that the statements that Moore
claims to know are true
,
but that we know them to be true
,
e.g. philosophers
who deny that we know that there are material things and/or other selves, are
involved in a similar inconsistency by merely stating their thesis. This
thesis is about Mus," or human knowledge
,
and therefore implies the exis-
tence of human beings. Moore believes that these philosophers hold that there
^
Philos ophical Papers
,
pr>. 40-41.
^oee Part II, Chapter 17 of this paper.
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ale human beings (that they know there are) and at the same time
that no human being knows that there are other human beings. Here the phi-
losopher in stating his thesis is not only contradicting other things which
he holds; the thesis is self-contradictory. These philosophers may admit
thao they believe the statements in Moore's list, speaking of such beliefs
as the beliefs of common sense, but deny that they know them. Yet, to say
that there are beliefs of common sense is to say that many humans hold cer-
tain beliefs and this also implies that there are many humans.^
The fact that the first two types of inconsistency exist does not
ha/o as a consequence that the philosophical view in question is not true.
The third type of inconsistency involves self-contradiction in the thesis
itself, with the consequence that the thesis is not true. Moore does not say
way he is noting these inconsistencies
; he merely says they are "specially
deserving of notice." White suggests that Moore believes that the exis-
tence of these inconsistencies (in part) makes it reasonable to hold that
common sense statements are true.-^ We have seen that Moore does say that
no philosopher has been able to contradict common sense consistently. But,
perhaps, this merely suggests that common sense beliefs are compulsively ac-
cepted, that one cannot help believing them. Does this make the belief rea-
sonable? Moore, after noting the inconsistencies, asks, "But do I really
m
know all the propositions (in my list) to be true? Isn't it possible that
I merely believe them?" Moore does not suggest that the existence of the
inconsistencies makes his belief reasonable. He says, "In answer to this
^
Philosophical Papers
, pp. 42-43.
^Ibid
.
, p. 39.
-'White, op. cit,
, pp* 11-15.
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question, I think I have nothing better to say than that it seems to me that
I do know them, with certainty. nl
c
* ^PJ^ing.. Actually Moore does have something bet-
ter to say, or at least he has points to make which may put his acceptance of
common sense in better light, make it more satisfactory to a philosopher. Sen-
tences like the above 3n which Moore merely insists that he knows the common
sense statements to be true, may give the impression that he makes this claim
for no reason at all, that it is an irrational assumption, or that his words
disguise his method.
White suggests tnat Moore’s reasons for believing common sense state-
ments are not ol the evidential sort.~ White’s entire account is unclear be-
cause he does not distinguish having evidence, needing evidence, and giving
evidence. White says that Moore accepts the common sense bel.iefs because they
are ’’ultimate.” White’s conception of ultimacy is either both or only the sec-
ond of the following notions; (1) known immediately, i.e., without inference,
(2) cannot be proved. White seems to believe that because com. on sense state-
ments are not provable, we cannot have evidence for them, and that Moore’s con-
cern is to show that "oar claims on behalf of common sense are more reasonable
than any other. ” White never says anything which is clearly false; but his
account is poor because of what he does not say. Admittedly, interpreting
^Philosophical Paper s, p. ^3.
White, op . cit .
,
pp, 18-19.
I'did
.
, pp. 15-1?
.
am uncertain about this.
^White, op. cit .
,
p. 19.
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Moore here is difficult because he changed his mir.d about the status of our
knowledge of the common sense statements.
In 1910 Moore believed that our knowledge of some common sense
statements is immediate knowledge. Knowing immediately is knowing without
inference, knowing a proposition without having to know2 any other proposi-
tion from which at follows. "But it is important to insist that even ’when
you do know a proposition immediately, you may; also at the same time know
some proposition from which it follows," Thus, Moore believes that a propo-
sition may be known both immediately and mediately. 3 Moore, here, is unclear
about wnether our knowledge of these common sense statements is only immedi-
ate or also mediate. He says they are "only known immediately," but his fur-
ther comments indicate that they are also known mediately, and the "only" in
"only known immediately" may bo pejorative.*'
In 1925 ("Defence of Common Sense") Moore aeknovjledges that some
common sense prepositions are not known "directly: that is to say, I only
know them because, in the past, I have known to be true other propositions
which were evidence for them." An example of the sort of proposition he has
in mind is the one that the earth has existed for many years before Moore was
born, Moore makes the epistemic point that though he does not know exactly
what the evidence is, this is no good reason for doubting that he knows the
^3uch as "This is a pencil."
%oore says "without knowing;" but this is probably carelessness
—
otherwise ho would be contradicting his own view that a proposition can be
known both mediately and immediately.
"'Some Main Problems of Philosophy
,
p. l4l. For Moore, if S knows
p immediately, 3 need not have drawn an inference in order to know p, but none-
theless he may have inferred p from some other proposition, Moore’s epistemic
principles will be displayed below.
^Ib'jq
. ,
p, 141.
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proposition. "We are all, I think, in this strange position that we do
]oiow many things, with regard to which we know further that we must have
had evidence for them, and yet we do not know how we know them, i.e., we
do not know what the evidence was."1 Here Moore’s comments are directed
Oftly toward the more complex sorts of common sense beliefs and not to be-
liefs such as "Hy body exists."
But in 1939 » Moore goes a step further, suggesting that we do
have evidence for the simpler sort of common sense beliefs. If we have
evidence, our- knowledge is not merely immediate.
How am I to prove no;* that "Here’s one hand, and
here’s another"? I do not believe I can do it. In order
to do it, I should need to prove for one thing
,
as Descartes
pointed out, that I am not now dreaming; I have conclusive
evidence that I am awake; but that is a very different thing
from being able to prove it. I could not tell you what all
my evidence is; and I should require to do this at least, in
order to give you proof.
'
Moore does believe he has evidence for "I am awake," but claims that ho is
not ablo to give his evidence. Moore rejects the view that, if he cannot
prove "Here is a hand," he cannot know it, aid must accept it merely as a mat-
ter of faith, "I can know things which I cannot prove.
G. 3, Moore. "Proof of an External World," Philosophical Papers,
pp. 43-44.
“
p
Philosophlcal Pane 1- 3
,
p. 143.
3Ibid.
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Finally, in his notebooks of 1941-1942 (and perhaps earlier),
Moore expressly rejects the view that he knows such simple statements as
"That is a dog" immediately. He admits that he does not infer them, but
claims that he knows them because he knows other things; he could not know
them vri Inoat Knowing other things. Here Moore contrasts "That is a dog"
with "I’ve get a pain." Ho says that we have evidence for the former but
none for trie latter, or, if we do have evidence for the latter, we nonethe-
less know it independently of our evidence. 1 Moore examines the case of
Crusoe spotting a footprint and concluding that a mail has been there, Cru-
soe’s knowledge that a man has been there, and perhaps his knowledge that
what he sees is a footprint are genuine cases of inference. "But what we
have to consider is his knowledge that it is sand which is formed into that
pattern; this is what I was saying to Blake was not immediate. That it's a
pattern in sand
, not a hallucination of a pattern in sand, not an image of
a pattern in sand or a dreamt pattern in sand."^ Moore believes that, when
he says "That’s a dog," part of what he is saying is that it has another
side, is of substantial thickness, and isn't empty. These are all things
learnt from past experience. Therefore, his knowledge that that is a dog is
not immediate, because I only know it because I have learnt
by past experience that things that look like this always
have a substantial thickness and an inside. If I only saw,
felt, and remembered what I do at this moment, I shouldn't
know that it was a dog: this knowledge is due to my having
learnt by past experience how things generally behave...My
^Commonplace Book, pp, l?3-4.
•V)lck
, p 0 175*
grounds are gej^alizati^ which I’ve learnt by past
experience; and I don't remember goners lizations.-*-
Here Moore has taken a full turn from his 1910 position and believes that
we cannot know simple common sense statements unless we know other things
It should be noted that Moore's epistemic principles remain the
SfiiC. I should like to list those which have boon mentioned.
1. S knows p immediately o 3 can know p without having evidence
for p.
2. S knows p immediately 4 3 doe s not, have evidence for p.
j. S knows p merely immediately 3 does not have evidence feu* p,
k. 3 knows p mediately :> 3 does have evidence for p.
5* 3 has evidence for p ? 3 can give the evidence for p, or say
what his evidence for p is.
6. 3 can prove p a> 3 can give evidence for p, or say what his
evidence for p is.
?. "3 cannot prove p" is compatible with ”3 has evidence for p."
In 1910, Moore believed that he knew "This is a pencil" either merely
immediately or also mediately. Perhaps by 1939 and surely by 1942 he believed
that he did not know "Here's a hand" or "That's a deg" immediately. And, as
far as I can see, everything which is said in his proof of an external world is
compatible with the view that we do not know "Here's a hand" immediately. He
says he cannot prove it, but implies that he has evidence for it. Ho does not
say that he could not know "Here’s a hand" without the evidence; but neither
does he claim the contrary. Moore's later view seems to be that he needs evi-
dence for "Hare’s a. hand," that he has the evidence, but that he cannot give
the evidence because he does not remember it. The evidence is (at least in
part) generalizations about "things that look like this" or "how things
generally behave." note that even if Moore could remember these generaliza-
tions, he probably could not give a proof which would satisfy some philos-
ophers, because such generalizations would assume the existence of things,
i*e., external objects. What would the generalisations be generalizations
of, if not, statements about things? Moore suggests that he knows that he is
sitting down and not standing up because he has learnt a generalization (causal)
from, past experience. But he asks, "How could I have learnt (this)? Surely,
only if 1 knew on other occasions, when I had this kind of experience, that I
was not standing up. And it's impossible I should ever have known this, if
before knowin g' it I had to know on other occasions that I was standing up.
It was problems such as this which in 1910 led Moore to claim that
common sense statements themselves are immediately known. If one needed evi-
dence in order to know any proposition, then one would need evidence for one's
evidential propositions and so on. He believed some proposition must be known
immediately, whether it be of the form "This pencil exists" or "The sense-
data which I directly apprehend are a sign that it exists." He used such a
sentence as "This pencil exists" in his proofs of the existence of material
and external objects because he believed that they (or at least their sense-
data alternatives) "arc much more certain than any premise- which could be used
to prove that they are false." They are more certain than Hume's principles,
for example. Moore acknowledged that his argument may not be very convincing
^Commonplace Book, p. 186,
2
'Some Main Problems of Philos ophy, p. 139ff.
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but claimed that it was a good argument, the strongest possible. 1 We may
presume that even if Moore changed his mind about which, or whether any,
propositions are immediately know, he kept his view that at least many com-
mon sense beliefs are more certain than the principles which philosophers
use to show they are false.
I think a fair extension of Moore's view, in the "casual mode," is
that we can jus ^ as well start oil with the beliefs of common sense as with
&ny of the solemn philosophical principles which arc supposed to be unim-
peachable. We can make common sense our touchstone without committing any
philosophical errors. And it's the beliefs of common sense which really seem
most certain anyway! Moore's linguistic remarks serve as preliminary clari-
fication, much needed clarification considering the uniqueness of Moore's
view. His epistemic principles correct mistakes of other philosophers while
showing that his own view does not involve him in ar.y philosophical errors.
And it should be clear by now that Moore's acceptance of common sense is inde-
pendent of his beliefs about language. It is true that Moore's epistemic
principles ha.ve their counterparts in statements about how epistemic words
are (or should be) used in ordinary language. And Moore often refers to what
wo commonly mean by words, often epistemic words. Finally, Moore relegates
what some philosophers seem to have meant by their assertions that, e.g., ma-
terial things are not real, to a subsidiary position in his "Defence of Common
Sense throwing against them only his claim that there is no good reason to
believe thorn. For example, he says, "I hold... that there is no good reason
to suppose. .. that every physical fact is logically dependent on some mental
"Some Main Problems of Philosophy , pp. 142-3 .
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fact ..."1 Is Moore's defense, then, off the mrM to, is it, in some sense,
linguistic? Does his claim that he knows for certain that there are hands
dopend upon his ordinary and non-philosophieal use of"know." Does his
claii that Matter, Time, etc., exist, really counter what any philosopher
has really intended? The*, questions will be taken up in part two of this
paper, which follows.
"
'Philosophical Papers
, p, 45 .
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PART J.T
SOME 1IIT3RPRSTATIONS OF MOORE'S DEFENSE OF SN3E;
THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS
3S
CHAPTER IV
MOORE'S PARADOX
In the first part of this paper, I have examined Moore's defense
ox common sense. Linguistic considerations were found to be preliminary and
independent of Moore's acceptance of common sense as the touchstone of truth.
Moore defends common sense and refutes traditional philosophers by denying
philosophical statements which ho believes contradict common sense beliefs.
If the philosophical statements m question do not contradict common sense,
Moox e s refutation does not work, A number of Moore's critics believe that
the philosophical statements do not contradict common sense. They believe
that philosophical statements are not what they seem to be, that if we take
there, as Moore does, to contradict common sense, a certain paradox arises.
This paradox, which Morris Lazerowitz calls "Moore's Paradox," is
Moore’s view that philosophers "have been able to hold sincerely, as part
of their philosophical creed, propositions inconsistent with what they them-
selves knew to be true. „
.
Lazerowitz claims that is "impossible" that
pphilosophers have sincerely held propositions which they knew to be false.
Characteristically, Moore answers, simply, that there is no reason to suppose
3that this is impossible.
Norman Malcolm finds the philosophical statements themselves para-
doxical, in that they go against common sense, "a philosophically unsophisticated
^Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit, ,
p. 374.
^Ibid
, p. 380.
^
"Reply to His Critics," Pail. A. Schilpp, op. cit. , p. 675.
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person would find them shocking."1 Koore would agree; but ne would add
that philosophers also should find them shocking, because, according to
Moore, everybody knows the common sense view of tbs world to be true. While
Moore never used the term "paradox" in this connection, his approach, as I
have noted, suggests an extensive conflict between philosophy arid common
sense. According to Moore, at least some philosophers have definitely held
views which contradict common sense. Some philosophers have held "material
objects do not exist" in the sense which these words would normally be taken
to have. In this sense, the philosophical statement is empirical^ and in-
compatible with the statement, "There are pencils."
Faced with Moore’s paradox, Moore’s critics have concluded that
Moore was mistaken in believing that the philos ophical statements in question
are empirical. 3y examining philosophical statements in light of their juxta-
position to the beliefs of common sense by Moore, these critics have developed
not only interpretations of Moore’s method, but also accounts of the nature of
philosophical statements in general. Malcolm claims that philosophical state-
ments convey information about ordinary usage, which usage is ipso facto cor-
rect, He believes that Moore, in giving correct accounts of ordinary usage,
has successfully refuted philosophical statements which go against ordinary
language. On the other hand, Morris Laserowita, who also believes that philo
sophleal statements are not empirical, argues that they are neither necessary
statements nor accounts of ordinary language. He believes that they are,
instead, disguised proposals to change language and that Moore’s refutations
are not refutations, but rather counter-proposals to keep the linguistic
^Korman Malcolm, ’Moore and Ordinary Language,” Paul A. Schilpp,
op „ cit
. ,
p. 346.
p>
'Commonplace Book
, p. 202.
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status quo. Malcolm argues; philosophical statements are not empirical,
they are mistaken accounts of ordinary language, therefore they are false,
Lazerowitz argues; philosophical statements are not empirical, they are
not necessary statements, they are not accounts of ordinary language; ra-
ther, they are linguistic proposals, and, as such, irrefutable (although
counter-proposals may be in order). A third position, which Malcolm some-
times takes, is that philosophical statements are linguistic proposals and
neans of an argument concerning polar terms. Alice Ambrose
suggests another variation on the basis of an investigation of category
words
. In all cases, the interpretation of Moore corresponds with the ac-
count ol philosophical statements in general. If traditional philosophers
are making linguistic proposals, Moore is making counter-proposals. If tra-
ditional philosophical conclusions are verbal in import, so are Moore’s,
In the following chapters, I will examine, in further detail, these
views of Moore’s critics. Ultimately, my aim is to clarify the relationship
between Moore’s defense of common sense and the philosophical views which
seem to go against common sense. To accomplish this aim, an examination of
the nature of philosophical statements, along the lines of the one undertaken
by Moore’s critics, is helpful. I will ask, with the critics, whether philo-
sophical statements are empirical, or necessary statements, linguistically
informative, or verbal in import.
In what follows, the phrase, "philosophical statement," will often
be used, 3y "philosophical statements," I do not mean all of the statements
which appear in books of philosophy, but only those very striking ones with
which philosophers often express their conclusions. Very often these
“dee Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
on. clt.
, pp. 345-6, where a fairly extensive list is given.
statements are generalizations such as:
All empirical statements are hypotheses.
All word s are vague.
A priori statements are
Sometimes they say of things of a
another:
rul.es of grammar.
certain c__ass that they are really of
Material objects are really ideas.
Material objects are really events.
Philosophical statements are really linguistic proposals.
Often they assert that things of a certain kind do not exist:
Material objects do not exist.
There are no temporal events
,
Or, they deny that something is real:
Time is unreal.
Space is not real.
Sometimes they assert that a certain class of things doss exist:
There are propositions
.
Numbers exist
,
Other statements concern perception or knowledge:
No material thing exists unperceived.
We do not know for certain that there are material objects,
inallv, many involve the concept of appearance or illusion:
Material objects are but appearances.
Tims is merely an appearance.
All is illusion.
b2
And there are many others:
The way up and the way down are the same.
Things are identical if they are indiscernible.
Nothing changes.
All is One.
Truth is the correspondence of thought to fact.
All of these are philosophical statements; although it should be noted at
the outset that Moore was primarily concerned with those which deny the
existence or reality of things of a certain class and those which deny
that we know that things of a certain kind exist or are real. My first
concern will be with the question whether or not philosophical statements
are empirical.
CHAPTER V
ARE PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS EMPIRICAL?
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A * V^iJL^ation. One of the considerations which
Moore’s critics offer to show that philosophical statements are not empirical
is the fact, according to them, that philosophers do not offer empirical evi-
dence for their conclusions, 1 or, even stronger, that no empirical evidence
can be given, 2 Ambrose points out that philosophical investigations are not
empirical, by which she means that philosophers have no laboratories, cannot
claim to closer observation than other people, and do not use experiments in
their demonstrations
,
1
ihe philosopher is often pictured as an armchair scientist, who,
without benefit of experiment, makes astounding claims about the world..
While it is true that the philosopher may remain in his armchair, it simply
is not true that he does not appeal to empirical facts/' dome times the em-
pirical facts are of a fairly sophisticated kind, and in these cases the
philosopher depends upon the scientist for his information. A moralist may
appeal to anthropological and psychological facts; a political philosopher
to historical and sociological facts; an epistemologist to physiological
and neurological facts as well as discoveries in physics (e.g„, that light
/dorman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A, Sehilpp,
op« cit.
, p. 360 .
^Alice Ambrose, "Moore’s ’Proof of an External World,’"
Paul A® Sehilpp, op. cit,
, p. 402,
"Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis (Hew York: Humanities Press,
1966), p, 143.
^Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the ’Proposal Theory' of Philosophy,"
Richard Rorty, ed.. The Linguistic Turn . (Chicago: University of Chicago,
p, 157. The following discussion owes much to Chisholm's discussion
of the same point.
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ta^es time to travel); and a metaphysician may appeal to scientific facts
and theories concerning matter, evolution and the brain. Philosophers
also appeal to empirical facts which are common knowledge, e.g., that some-
times people have hallucinations, that people are sometimes misled by per-
ceptual illusions
,
that dreams sometimes seem real. Finally philosophers
often appeal to autobiographical facts.
V.'hile it is true that the philosopher does nit carry on investiga-
tions in the way that the scientist does, he does appeal both to scientific
and commonly known empirical facts. Ralph Blake notes that if metaphysical
statements are those for which wc could have no possible evidence, then even
Spinoza • s doctrine of a simple substance is not metaphysical, for he does
give evidence, although this evidence may have hardly any weight-. 1 Just
vnat part empirical facts play in a philosophical argument, how much weight
they have, ar.d so on, are matters of great Importance and will be taken up
below. But the first point of note is that philosophers de offer empirical
evidence.
Why then do philosophical disputes continue through the ages?
Some of Moore’s critics claim that these disputes are unresolvable because
philosophical statements are unverifiable and that this fact is another rea-
son to conclude that they are r.ot empirical. Lazerowitz seems to believe
that the fact that philosophical disputes remain unresolved despite tho
counter-moves of the type made by Diogenes and Moore is reason enough to
believe that philosophical statements are not empirical. Further, he claims
that "no known facts count against" philosophical statements, "no imaginable
1
Ralph M. Blake, "Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended?"
Philos ophy cal Review , L*J i (19^3) • P* 12?ff.
k-5
or descnbable facts.
. .Nothing we can picture to ourselves would falsify"
the philosopher’s view. His proposition is not one which "could imaginably
be false, i.e., an e^Jjcal proposition."1 Lazerowitz seems to be making
tne point, that philosophical statements are not falsifiable, and conclud-
ing, from this fact, that philosophical statements are not empirical. He
scorns tc believe that, if a proposition is not falsifiable (or verifiable),
tnen it is not empirical. This view is similar to the view of Ayer^ and
others that, if a proposition is not verifiable, then it is meaningless.
Chisholm points out, in answer to Lazerowitz, that "no one has yet suc-
ceeded in formulating a criterion of verifiability which will allow us to
say both tnat tno statements of science and common sense are verifiable and
that those of philosophy or metaphysics are not verifiable."1 If no cri-
terion of verifiability is available, then verifiability cannot be used as
a criterion for deciding whether or not a statement is empirical.
Still, Lazorowitz may be making the more limited point that while
empirical generalisations such as "All ravens are black" can be falsified by
empirical statements such as "Here is a white raven," there is no way of simi-
larly falsifying a philosophical generalization. Lazerowitz may mean that one
cannot falsify "There are no material objects," by producing a hand as Moore
thinks he can. lazorowitz must believe that the statement, "There are no ma-
terial objects , " is not to be taken in the sense in which it is incompatible
Morris Lazerowits, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit .,
p. 381"'2. See also Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis, p, 1*13.
^A. *J. Ayer, Language , Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (Victor Gcllancz;
U.S.A.: Dover Publication, 1916).
^Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the ’Proposal Theory' of Philosophy,"
Richard Rorty, on . cit .
,
p. 158.
most part, the evidence
with "There are hands." It is true that, for the
which a philosopher offers is not in the form of instances of which his
generalisations are generalizations. A philosopher does not go from place
to place failing uo find & material object here and there and then conclude
with a generalization of his findings: there are none. In spite of this,
if in fact tne philosopher means his conclusion to be incompatible with
common sense beliefs, then his conclusion can be falsified. But the fact
that the philosopher aocs not proceed in the above manner may be a good rea-
son for suspecting that his conclusion is not falsifiable in the way that
Moore thinks it is.
Besides the term "falsify," Lazerowitz also uses the terms "count
against" and "settle." Lazerowitz finds it self-contradictory to say that
philosophical disputes with regard to matters of fact cannot be settled em-
pirically. "Count against" is a term which could have various specific
formulations. Vfe found that falsification is too strong a sense of "count
against." Is there some other sense in which empirical facts, other than the
sort which Moore presents, would count against philosophical theories? Would
the fact that, due to medical advance, men became immortal, count against
philosophical theories of an after-life or existential philosophies concerning
death? Does the fact that certain philosophers have appealed to false facts,
e.g,, that people with jaundice see yellow, count against their theories?
What if, henceforth, men cease to suffer hallucination or illusion and fail
to dream? If, after thorough investigation, the anthropologist concluded
that indeed there aro certain moral codes present in all cultures, would
this count against an ethical theory? It is not easy to answer these ques-
tions. Perhaps in most cases these facts could not be said to disprove a
1
Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit._ , p.
4?
philosophical theory, but they would tend to Influence philosophical
theorizing.
The problem is one of clarifying the evidential relationship bo-
tween common sense and scientific statements and their evidence on the one
hand, and philosophical statements and their evidence on the other. Per-
haps, it is even misleading to speak of "evidence" for and against philo-
sophical theories. The facts which a philosopher cites do not seem to have
the* same relationship to his conclusion as the facts which a scientist
cites have to his conclusion, and we might wish to reserve "evidence" for
scientific contexts. But philosophers are notorious for ruling out kinds
of knowledge and types cf proof which do not conform to a certain ideal.
For example
,
many philosophers have ruled out knowledge for which they
could find no deductive or mathematical
-like argument, In this century,
some philosophers have wished to rule out philosophical statements which
coulo not be verified in the way that scientific statements are verified.
V/e might speculate that the ways people come to philosophical, common sense,
scientific and mathematical (or logical) knowledge, that is the kinds of
evidence or reasons offered and the methods of argument, are- all different
from one another. One should not oxpect an argument for a scientific thesis
to be deductive; an argument for a common-sense belief to be deductive or
simply and strictly inductive; or an argument for a philosophical thesis to
always conform to one cf the other established methods of argument. For now,
I will leave the question, of just how philosophical arguments work, open and
attempt a partial answer in the conclusion of this paper.
Tho other terra, "settle," is also vague, in this context. Iazoro-
vrltz believes that philosophical disputes cannot be settled empirically.
Moore believes that he has refuted the view that there are no external ob-
jects. But, in fact, few philosophers feel that the issue is thereby set-
tled. On the scientific side, though, it would be perhaps naive to claim
tnat it is ever settled, once and for all, whether or not a scientific
theory is true. New evidence may falsify the theory. One after another,
scientific theories have been either rejected or restricted. Faced with
certain facts which might bo said to count against the phlogiston theory,
some scientists who held the theory postulated that phlogiston was a very
peculiar fluid in that it had negative volume—before they eventually gave
up the theory. Newtonian physics, which was at one time generally accepted,
2s now said to work only if the quantities in question are of a certain or-
cer; strictly speaking, the laws of Newtonian physics, as originally stated,
are false. How fac^s count against higher order scientific theories and in
whci.t sense scientific disputes are ever really settled are complicated is-
sues which should be taken up if wo are to distinguish clearly philosophical
from scientific arguments and conclusions. In philosophy, there is no simi-
lar history of theories being rejected and restricted because of new empiri-
cal evidence. Empirical facts do not bring about a consensus in philosophi-
cal thought, in bhe way that such facts do bring about consensus in scientif-
ic thought. These considerations may incline us to believe that philosophical
statements are. not empirical, or are unlike other empirical statements. But
Moore’s position that at least sometimes philosophers have meant their con-'
elusions to bo empirical does not fly in the face of these observations about
philos ophleal his tory
.
A further view, which is not so much argued as implicit in the
arguments that philosophical statements are not empirical, is the view that
h9
only verifiable or falsifiable, or scientific, or common sense statements
firC " aC "Ual * i‘‘alc: ' :bl says that the Phenomenalist agrees with the common
man about the facts of the situation ordinarily described as "seeing a
tree."1 Ambrose claims that philosophical statements are not tactual be-
cause philosophical statements are not empirical. 2 As Chisholm points out.
thss is a criteriological issue which leads to an impasse. If one phiios-
op.ui &U-S, for example
, that unverifiable statements are not factual and
another philosopher disagrees, they are disagreeing about the criterion of
factualness. Attention to specific cases will not resolve the disagreement
because they will disagree about specific cases also. 3 More will be said
about criteriological issues in the last chapter of this paper.
The arguments considered heretofore revolve around
the notions of verification and evidence. Another argument that philosophi-
cal statements are not empirical is perhaps suggested by Moore's account of
metaphysics as an inventory of the most important kinds of things in the uni-
4
verse, Ambrose argues that the question whether external objects exist is
no a question ox inventory, not an empirical question, as Moore thinks it
J.S , ner intention is to show "that Moore's proof (of an external world) ivS
not analogous to an ordinary empirical argument."3 It might seem, she says,
Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A, Schilpp,
op . cit,, p. 337 .
2
Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis
,
p. I4j,
Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the 'Proposal Theory* of Philos-
ophy," Ri chard F.orty, pp . ci t .
,
p. 158.
4
See Cnapter I.
3Alice Ambrose, "Moore's 'Proof of an External World,'" Paul A.
Schilpp, on. pit
.
,
p , 406.
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that "external object" is a general name, the most general of the series,
"dime," "coin," "external object." But 1) one cannot "'point out an ex-
ternal object’ and thereby settle any question about whether there is a
thing of ohat kind," 2) one could not teach or learn "external object" os-
tensively as one can teach "dime" and "coin" by pointing out the object,
calling attention to its features and testing the pupil by having him bring
the object in question; therefore, "'external object' is not a general name
for some kind of thing, designating features distinguishing that kind of
thing from some other kind."^ Moore answers:
Now if "point out" is taken literally to mean "point
with the finger at," this may be true. But in a sense,
which is, it seems to me, very relevant to our problem,
it is not true. One can point out to a person an object
which is not an external object by the method. ..for find-
ing. . . a "sense-datum.
Or, less controversially, by getting hem to have an after-image. An after-
image would also be the sort of object which is not spatial and not material.
Thus
,
an argument from ostensive availability will not work to show that the
terms of philosophical statements arc not general names.
But Ambrose has another argument to this effect. She is arguing
that category words are not generic terms, not even the most general of
generic terms, as, for example, Wisdom believes: "the most general genus
words, i.e., category words, are peculiar and are not related to their species
^Alice Ambrose, "Moore's 'Proof of an External World,'" Paul A. Schilpp,
op. cit,_, pp. 405-6.
2
G. E. Moore, "Reply to His Critics," Paul A. Schilpp, o^_ cit.
,
p. 6?1.
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words just like other genus words are related to their species words.-1 In
the argument now under consideration, Ambrose makes no reference to the phil-
osophically interesting phrases, "external object," "material object," "space
"time," "self, " but is concerned rather with i-;hat might be called the more
abstract terms, "individual," "property," "relation," "proposition," and "num-
ber." ohe argues that these terms are not generic because certain sentences
involving them have their truth range and significance range the same. Am-
brose's position is illustrated in the following way. Take a sample subject-
predicate sentence which may be said to inform us that a certain object be-
longs to a certain genus: "x is a rickshaw." When the term substituted for
x refers to a rickshaw, the statement is true; when it refers to chairs, air-
planes, and other "real, objects" the sentence is false. Other substitutions
for x, such as "2," "monarchy," "walking," "red," and "later," result in non-
sense. Substitutions for x, which refer to delusive rickshaw appearances,
make the sentence false.
"x is a rickshaw"
True for: rickshaws } .
False for: other real objects) 1
^
True for: rickshaws ) reality- ) significance
False for: delusive rickshaw ) appearance ) range
appearances ) range )
"2," "monarchy," ) nonsense
"walking," etc. )
This is contrasted with sentences involving category words. The sentence, "x
is a thing," has its truth and significance ranges the same, if we consider
only real things, "real" in the sense in which it is distinguished from "ap-
pearance .
"
].
John Wisdom
,
"Moore's Technique, " Paul A. Schilpp, op. clt. p. .
"x is a thing"
True for : things
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) reality )
_ ~~—
—
) range ) . _
.
True for: things ) reality- )
significance
False for: shadows, ) appearance )
range
etc. ; range )
"2," "monarchy," ) nonsense'
"red," "perception," etc.)
Ambrose argues that since, within the reality range of values for x in »x
is a idling," there are only values which make the proposition true and none
which make it both significant and false;, tnat is, since from choosing with-
in this range we could not fail to establish the truth, "thing" is not a ge-
neric word like "rickshaw," and it is at least "doubtful that v;e should call"
the statement, "x is a thing," empirical, as we would call "x is a rickshaw"
empirical.
If Ambrose is using "thing" in the sense in which only material ob-
jects or external objects may be said to be things, then her argument is direct-
ly relevant to Koore’s defense of common sense and proof of an external world.
But she often seems to be using "thing" in the sense in which it is synonymous
with the philosophical senses of "individual," "entity," and "object." In
this sense, after-images, sense-data, platonic entities (numbers, propositions,
platonic forms), and God might qualify as things. At one point, Ambrose refers
to Bradley’s claim that it is self-contradictory to say that things, properties
end relations exist; ^ if she means "thing" in the second sense discussed,
Bradley might answer that he did not say this of things, for he did bold that
one thing does exist, namely the Absolute,
*"Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis, p. ?M 0
.
^Examples are discussed below.
3Ibid.
,
p. 233.
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For the, moment let us consider "thing" only in the sense in which
it is synonymous with "material object" or "external object." Ambrose may
believe she is meeting Moore's objection to her first argument (discussed
above) by distinguishing between a reality range and a reality-appearance
range. She admits that '"thing' functions like a generic name to sot off
things from appearances."1 But, for her, "the function of a generic name
is... to distinguish between different kinds of things,"1 and while she ad-
mits that "thing" functions like a generic term in setting off things from
appearances
,
still she seems cot to want to adroit it as a generic term be-
cause it docs not "distinguish among kinds of things
. If Ambrose is us-
ing "thing" consistently as synonymous with "material object," what she
says, in effect, is that a term is a generic term only if it distinguishes
among kinds of material objects, 'Material object" itself', as well as "sha-
dow," "mirage," "after-image," "dream image," and "hallucinatory image," are
not generic terms; and the sentences, "That is a material object," That is a
shadow," etc, are not empirical. But this is plainly false, "That is a
shadow" is certainly not a priori ; "That is a material object" is clearly
contingent for what is referred to may be a ha?Llucinatory image. Ambrose
ma.y fina some advantage in reserving "generic term" only for those terms which
distinguish between kinds of material objects, but this predilection does not
seen allow her to infer that "x is a thing" (whore "thing" sets things off
from appearances) is not empirical. On the contrary, what she says is com-
patible with Moore's view that it is empirical,
^Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis
, p. 240.
2
Ibid,_, p. 239.
3
Ibid
., p. 240.
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The o Olid* sons© 01 * lthincf n in x-iV\i -? + ^c? r-of ~ wn ch it is synonymous with "indi-
"entity
’
M and "«•" is «» “ *ioh it is roughly of the s#Be
grad® °f abstra“tion 85 "Proposition,"
"property," "relation," and "num-
ber." Ambrose calls all of these "category «ords
. Moore believes that
there are, in the Universe, propositions, but he is not concerned to show
that this is an empirical matter. Only the questions of the existence of
material objects, space, time, and selves are directly relevant to his de-
fense of common sense. And, only if Ambrose can show that these questions
fire not empirical, can she maintain that Moore's proof of the external world
is not valid or is not what it seems to be. Still, her discussion of the
more abstract category words is important for an understanding of the na-
ture of philosophical statements in general, for some philosophical, disputes
have involved, these terms.
Wittgenstein claimed that ’’object," "complex,” •Tact,” "function,"
and "number" are "formal concepts" represented by variables and that the
propositions expressed by "There are objects," "There are numbers," etc. are
2
nonsensical* Ambrose does not agree with Wittgenstein on this last point:
...it is not intended that translatability into the
notation of logic is to bo taken as a test of the sense or
nonsense of a corresponding English expression, but rather
that peculiarities which show up in the logical notation
3highlight peculiarities of English,.,
^ There may be some question as to whether these are all category
words; but this question is not directly relevant here. What is relevant
is whether or not they are generic terms.
2
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tracta.tus Logic o-Phllosophicus , trans.
D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (New York: The Humanities Press, 19<$1),
p. 57 (4.1272).
O
"Alice Ambrose, Essays in Arialysis
, p. 243.
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Wbat happens when one tries to translate ‘'There are
individuals "... into logical notation is an indication of
the difference between.
. .category concepts and generic
concepts
There are individuals" becomes 3x|W) , or in some way, involves this
tautology. Similar tautologies can be constructed for "There are qual-
ities," and "There are numbers:" f fX y*, fa) and . 3 The fact
that tautoloties result from attempts to express these statements in logi-
cal notation may lead one to Quine’s position that our logical notation may
be taken to express or presuppose an ontological commitment. Ambrose finds
Quine’s position puzzling.
What is puzzling is not merely the divergence of
opinion
,
between him and Wittgenstein, over whether the
phrase "existence of individuals" makes sense,, but that
he makes no attempt to represent an ontological presuppo-
sition in logical notation.*5
Quine probaoly realizes that ho cannot represent an ontological presupposi-
tion in logical notation. His view is that one is committed to an ontolog-
ical position by the kinds of variables one quantifies over; thus, any ex-
pression. in logic?! notation expresses an ontological presupposition, pro-
supposed by a decision to use certain variables. The presupposition cannot
*1
'‘Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analys is
,
p. 244.
2
Ibid_.
,
p. 245.
3Ibi d..
,
p. 242, and Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and
Ontology,” Richard Rorty, op. cit.
, p„
/;
Ibid
.
,
p. 245.
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be represented by a sentence of logical notation because
would, presuppose an ontological commitment.^ Perhaps the
tween Quine and Ambrose is that this fact does not bother
any such sentence
difference be-
Quine but it does
bother Ambrose*
What bothers Ambrose is not so much the non-translatability into
logical notation* but the peculiarity in English that this non-translatability
is supposed to highlight. This peculiarity is the identity of the truth
and significance ranges of "x is a thing" (here "thing” = "entity"), "x
is a. quality," "x is a number," etc. The claim, that this identity holds de-
pends on the claim that there arc no values for x which make these sentences
false. And, finally, this claim depends on the claim that "Monarchy is a
thing, T "2 is a tiling," "ibis (house) is a property," "Red is a relation,"
etc* are nonsensical, not false.
Whenever we cross categories or generic types in sentences of the
type under consideration the result is a sentence which rings nonsensical,
perhaps more so in direct proportion to the distance, so to speak, of the
one category or generic type from the other. Sentences ring most nonsensi-
cal when we cross categories and less nonsensical when we cross generic typos
which are closely related. We might construct a spectrum of nonsense: "This
(dog) is a cow," "Rover is a stone," "Rover is an artefact," "Rover is an
after-image," "Rover is a number," "Rover is a color," "Rover is a size,"
"Rover is a capability," "Rover is a distance," "Rover is better than domo-
cracy, " "Rover is a matriarchy," "Rover is a revolution," We may be tempted
h. V. 0. Quine
,
From £ Logical Point of View (New York: Harper
and Row, 1963), pp. 12-19.
9
Rover, need I say, is a dog.
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to say that the sentences on the tear end of the scale are false and not non-
sense. 'Hover is a com" is the most likely candidate for a false (significant)
sentence. Other candidates are: "This (plant) is an aninal." "That (natural
Stone formation) is an artefact." Examples do not cc.nc easily, but the point
is that some sentences vhich may be nonsensical in one situation may not in
another. A philosopher may find precedent here for claiming that his asser-
tions that Hover is really an event, or an idea, or a property (of the Abso-
lute), or that numbers are entitles, are not nonsensical, at least not in the
context cf philosophical discussion,.
Philosophers seem to think that it is a real question whether or not
certain items belong to certain kinds in cases in which we would ordinarily
think there is no question at all. Philosophers have disagreed not as to whe-
ther or not there are rickshaws
,
but, as Ambrose notes, as to whether or not’
Thai 0 si u ricxsnaws " implies "There are things."'*' Philosophers may very well
agree with one another about the existence of a certain item, yet disagree as
to which type under which to categorize it; they nay include the same items
on their inventory slip, but list the items under different headings. One
philosopher nay list all rickshaws under the heading, "appearances," and leave
empty the space under the heading, "external objects." One philosopher may
include all numbers under the heading, "entities," along with chairs, elephants,
and propositions. Another may have a separate heading for numbers
.
Ambrose
says that it is nonsense to say of a particular number that it is a thing, or
O
entity. But this dees not seam obviously true. Compare:
'“Alice Ambrose, Essays in Arm lysis
, p. 235*
^Ibid., p„ 256.
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2 is a thing.
Rover is a thing.
The Empire State Building is a thing.
My lover is a thing.
Essays in Analysis is a thing.
All of theo© sentences sound rather strange, perhaps because we hardly ever
have occasion to use them.
In spite of these considerations, Ambrose's thesis seems generally
correct as regards terms to which the reality-appearance distinction does not
c • sentences of the forms, "x is a proposition," "x is a number," "x is
a property, " and "x is a relation" do have their truth and significance ranges
the same, substitutions for x, which fail to make these sentences true, would
seem, in any situation, to result in nonsense. Ar.d this may be good reason to
suppose that "proposition," "number,' "property," and "relation" are not generi
terms and that whether or not propositions, numbers, properties, or relations
exist is not an empirical matter. "Color," "size," and perhaps other te 2 'ms
might bo added to the list (although, apparently, Ambrose thinks that "color"
is a generic term^).
The arguments against the view that philosophical statements are em-
pirical, considered in this chapter, may persuade us that philosophers* methods
and arguments are very unlike scientists' and that some philosophical terms are
not generic terms. It would seem safe to conclude that at least some philo-
sophical statements are not empirical. But Moore’s modest claim that some
philosophers have used, those statements, which seem to go against common sense,
^Alice Ambrose, Ess ays in Analys is
,
p. 238.
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m senses in which they are empirical has not met serious challenge. Am-
brose’s attempt to show that categories are not generic terms does seem
to work with regard to some philosophical terms but not with regard to those
t°ras VM-Ca are involved in Moore’s defense of common sense and proof of an
external world. let, Moore’s view would be seriously challenged, perhaps,
ii ohe philosophers who asserted the statements which seem to go against
common sense could hold consistently the view that their statements are
necessary statements and not empirical. This possibility will be examined in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
ARE KilLOSOrJICAL STATEMENTS NECESSARY STATEMENTS?
some philosophers, especially Bradley, have given the impression
that their statements are to be taken as statements of logical necessity.
Many of Bradley's arguments are to the effect that certain ordinary propo-
sitions are self-contradictory. Thus, when Bradley concludes that time is
unreal, Lazerovitz takes this to mean that the concept of time is sell-
contradictory, or, in the concrete, that it is logically impossible for
there to bo temporal events. 1 This would be a logically necessary state-
ment.
In the last chapter, I have noted that often philosophers refer
to empirical evidence to support their conclusions. It is also truo that
ThQ.yij ph-lo^opners examine concepts and words in arguing for their conclu-
sions. Zeno, Bradley and McTaggart are examples of philosophers who are
primarily concerned with the examination cf words and concepts. Roughly,
logically necessary statements are those whose truth-value depends solely
upon the meanings of the concepts or words in the statements. The fact that
philosophers very often concern themselves with the meanings of concepts or
words in arguing for their conclusions is evidence, although certainly not
proof, that their conclusions are logically necessary statements.
If Bradley's assertion that, e.g.,time is unreal, is a logically
necessary statement, then, at least sometimes, the philosophical statements
which seem to contradict common sense are not empirical. Morris Lazerowitz
argues that this and similar statements cannot be necessary statements. He
says that
^Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A, Schilpp, op. clt .,
p . 383
.
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...understanding a sentence of the form "x cannot..."
in which "cannot" has the meaning of logical impossibility,
is inconsistent with knowing what it would be like for there
to be states of affairs described by "x does,.."^
This principle, as stated, appears false, for it seems to me that we can
"Red cannot be a color," (and of course we know that red is a
color) and we can understand "It is logically impossible that there are
centaurs" (and we know what it would be like for there to be centaurs).
Perhaps what Lazerowitz means is that the proposition itself, expressed by
"x cannot..." is inconsistent with the proposition that we know what it would
be like for there to bo states of affairs described by "x does..." That a
square cannot be round is incompatible with knowing what it would be like
for there to bo round squares. Similarly, "It is logically impossible that
there are temporal events," is inconsistent with the fact that wo do know what
it would be like for there to be temporal events. And we do know this. If
one counters that vie know only what it would be like for there to bo apparent
temporax events, or appearances of temporal events, one is caught in a similar
inconsistency. For, as Lazerowitz points out, "There appears to be 0" implies
that it is logically possible that there is a 0. ' "There appears to be 0,"
and "It is logically necessary that there are no 0’s," are incompatible propo-
sitions. And Bradley seems to have held both that time is an appearance and
that it is logically necessary that time does not exist.
Even if Bradley’s statements are meant as logically necessary state-
ments, they can be refuted with empirical statements. If indeed it is an
J
Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op., pit.
,
p. 38’\
O
‘"Morris Lazerowitz, The S truc ture of Kainphysics (London: Routledge
and Kegah Paul, 1955) » P« 20d.’
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empirical fact that there are temporal events, then it is false that it is
logically necessary that there are no temporal events. If the philosphical
statements which contradict common sense are to be taken as expressing al_
necessary truths, this poses no threat to Moore's defense of common
sense. If, on the other hand, the question whether or not there are tem-
poral events simply cannot be settled empirically, then Moore's defense of
common sense is threatened. But I do not believe that anyone has suggested
that this is the case.
Ambrose’s argument, that categories are not generic terms, con-
sidered m the last chapter, may lead to the vie* that a number of philo-
sophical statements are necessary statements. She suggests that, at least
on one lev;!, Bradley’s statements are meant to express necessary truths. 2
An.,, 5, .; jtslieves, if a philosopher, like Moore, justifies his view that
there are things with a premise such as ”A house is a thing,” then this lat-
ter statement is a necessary statement. And, she seems to believe that the
same would be true of "Red is a quality,” and ’’North of is a. relation,” if
tnese statements were used to support the views that there are qualities and
that there are relations.^
If philosophical disputes can oe envisaged, at least in part, as
disputes about which headings under which to list certain items, as was sug-
ges tea in the las l- chapter', and if some of the headings are not generic terms,
eventually, she argues that since Bradley’s statements do not reflect
current usage, they are not necessary statements, but devices for altering lan-
guage, Tads argument will be taken up in the following chapters,
2
Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis
. p. 252.
3
roid._, p. 255.
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then it would seem that some of theso disputes are about analytic matters.
The philosopher who claims that what seem to be physical objects are really
events, ideas or properties (of tho Absolute }, or that numbers are entities,
may be making assertions which are not nonsensical statements but rather neces-
sary statements. Or at least the philosopher would take them to be necessary
statements. However, the view that, for example, Bradley believed that it is
necessarily true that there are no temporal events, flics in the face of Moore’s
paradox. How could philosophers believe that statements which contradict their
common sense beliefs are necessarily true? Faced with Moore’s paradox, some
philosopners have argued that statements which may seen to be necessary either
have linguistic counterparts or are really linguistic. These views will now
be presented.
CHAPTER VII
ARl> PLILO vOPHICAL STATEMENTS really about language?
A - Verbal 5ll £ffi£2±. The views that philosophical statements
are not empirical and that they are or seem to bo necessary statements
lead to the view that they are verbal in import. This view, in its en-
tirety is somewhat complex. I will first present the view and then oriti-
cize it.
Ambrose argues that "in understanding a sentence for a necessary
proposition and knowing what it expresses is necessarily true, what one
knows is a verbal fact." She elaborates with the following examples,
p: "Material bodies are extended,"
Q : "There are no white crows."
In knowing p, one knows that "unextended material bodies" has no applica-
tion, In knowing q, one knows that "white crows" has no application. Thes
are non-verbal facts. Thus far, the situation is the same for both senten-
ces , But,
in knowing that the one sentence expresses some-
thing contingently true, one knows the verbal fact that
"white crows" has in our language a descriptive use and
the non-verbal fact that it applies to nothing; while in
Icnowing that the other expresses something necessarily
true, ono knows- that "unextended material bodios" has no
descriptive use and one need know no non-verbal fact to
know that what the sentence expresses is true .
^
1
Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis
,
pp. 153~^*
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Ambrose’s thesis may be criticised on three levels. First, her
thesis depends on her view; a) that a phrase has no application is a non-
and that a Phrase has (or does not have) a descriptive use
i& a
—-Si* But this is misleading; neither of these sorts of fact
has only verbal constituents, such as a grammatical fact, or the fact that
two words
»
or phrases, are synonymous. Let us call a fact which has only
verbal constituents a solely verbal fact
. The fact that a phrase applies
to a (non-verbal) entity has as one of its constituents a non-verbal entity.
Lot us call a fact which includes both verbal and non-verbal constituents a
Xggfcjgl £§££• The fact that a phrase does not have application, the
sort of fact which "a" above mentions, is not a partially verbal fact because
it does not have any non-verbal constituents. Should we call it a solely ver-
bal fact? For cur- purposes, it. would be best to call a fact, whose negative
is a partially verbal fact, a negative partially verbal fact. The fact that
a phrase has a descriptive use, the sort of fact mentioned in ,Tb 9 ” is cither
1
1) the fact that there are no criteria for the application of the phrase, or
2) the fact that there could be entities of the sort to which the phrase re-
fers, Beth of these sorts of fact include non-verbal constituents. The first-
sore makes oblique reference to the people who have or lack criteria for apply-
ing the phrase. The second sort of fact includes, as constituents, the enti-
ties which it says could exist. Thus, the fact that a phrase has a descriptive
use is also a partially verbal fact.
Secondly, Ambrose 's use of the phrase "descriptive use" may make her
vulnerable to a charge of circularity or disguised triviality. Chisholm points
^ Hero I cm presupposing my discussion of "descriptive use," which fol-
lows ,
out that, While Ambrose’s argument depends upon the distinction between
"descriptive use" and "application," she has provided no definition or
explication of "descriptive use."
It, for example, the term "descriptive use" were defined by making
** 'o
use of necessity or contingency (e.g., "A phrase may be said to
have a descriptive use if and only if there could be something to
which it would apply"), Miss Ambrose "s argument would hardly be
,
•
1
conclusive
.
If this is what Ambrose means by "descriptive use," then her prin-
ciple would be that in knowing, for example, that there are no round squares,
ono knows that it is not the case that there could be round squares, which is
trivially true and cannot. support the view that necessary statements are ver-
bal in import.
Let us make some attempt to clarify what is meant by "descriptive
•use." First, the term "descriptive" in ^descriptive use" does not make refer-
ence to the typo of adjectives and nouns involved. It does not imply that they
p
are observation or sensation terms. A phrase which has a descriptive use is
simply a phrase which has the form of a descriptive phrase ("a such and such"
or "the such and such"), which phrase "functions descriptively," A phrase
functions descriptively if understanding it entails knowing what it would be
like for there to be something (or some situation) referred to by the phrase.
If a phrase functions descriptively it has a descriptive use. Thus, "the pre-
sent King of France," has a descriptive use since we know what it would be like
for there to be a present King of France even though the phrase does not refer.
^Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the ’Proposal Theory’ of Philos-
ophy," Richard Forty, op. cat,
,
p. 159
•
^Alice Ambrose, Fs s ay s in Analys is
,
p. 2j0. Ambrose says that "prime
between 10 and 15 " has a descriptive use.
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But "a round square- has no descriptive use since we do not know what it
would be like for there to be a round square. A different way of putting
this is that there are no criteria for the application of "round squares."
One might object that we do know what it would be like for there to be s.
round square
,
or alternatively, that we do have criteria for application
0.1 the phrase. A round square would have no corners, four angles, etc.
Let me summarize. There are three views as to what it is for a
phrase to have a descriptive use.
1* A phrase has a descriptive use— Understanding the
phrase entails knowing what it would be like for
there to be something referred to by the phrase.
(Lazerowitz's view.
)
A phrase has a descriptive use “-There could bo
something to which it would apply. (Chisholm's sug-
gestion. )
3* A phrase has a descriptive us There are cri-
teria for its application.
According to 2,
"Round squares" has no descriptive uses it is
not the case that there could be round squares.
Then, Ambrose's principle reads:
To know that there are no round squares is neces-
sarily true - to know that it is not the case that there
could be round squares,
which is trivially true.
According to 1 and 3> Ambrose's principle reads:
To know that there are no round squares is neces-
sarily truc~to know that there are no criteria for the
application of "round squares,"
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But- there are criteria (no corners, four angles, etc.). The criteria are
self-contradictory
,
but then this just takes us back into the circle. To
say that the criteria are self-contradictory is to say that there could be
no round squares.
Finally, Ambrose’s principle itself seems not to be true. Her
principle would allow:
1. To know that "There are no round squares" expresses
a necessary truth-to know that "round squares" has
no descriptive use.
Let "that ’There are no round squares’ expresses a necessary truth"= Let
"that ’round squares’ has no descriptive use"-^. Then, a consequence of 1
is
:
2, 3 know c< knows p
But there is a counter-example to 2.
a. (Assume) 3 knows
fc. S knows p s> 3 believes p
c, ^ (3 believes p) (This is the counter-example. S does
not believe either that words have or do not have a des-
criptive use; 3 is not a philosopher.)
d, (s believes B)o><v (
3
knows p) (from b.)
*\> 'V*' (S knows r)
t
‘
(5
( S knows d, ) * n.f ( 3 knows p
)
Ambrose's principle does not work for someone who has no view as to whether
or not any phrase has a descriptive use.
In this section I have criticized Ambrose’s view that philosophical
tatements, at least those which are necessary statements, are verbal in51
69
import. The corresponding view that Moore's refutations are also verbal
in import1 is as strong or as weak as Ambrose's view with regard to philo-
sophical statements in general. I believe I have shown that this view is
mistaken.
B
‘
---
^^soshical Statements Inform Us About Ordinary language ?
Malcolm holds a view similar to Ambrose's. While Malcolm does not have a
pr^w^oe argument to this effect, in general he seems to believe that philo-
sophical statements inform us as to the correct use of language. He says :
Russell was saying teat it js really a more correct way
cl ^peaking to say tnat you see a part of your brain, than
to say that you see a postman.
The philosopher wno says that we never know material thing statements for
certain
regards that form of speech ("I know for certain” ) impro-
per... in just the same way that the sentence, t:X see some-
thing which is totally invisible," is improper."*
The reason "I see something which is totally invisible,” is improper is that
it is self-contradictory, Malcolm believes that the philosopher is claiming
that certain ordinary expressions are self-contradictory. He interprets Moore's
refutations to be simply statements to the effect that these expressions are
l\
correct language. "Both the philosophical statement and Moore's reply to
Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis
, p, 255
.
*2
Homan Malcolm, 'Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
OOr Clt.
,
p. 350 •
3XbicU. P* 353.
4
Xbid,
, p. 350.
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it are disguised linguistic statements."1 Malcolm believes that Moore (as
-.nt-rprctx h.: ,«) ,,s correct, that an ordinary expression cannot be
selj.
-contradictory. By an "ordinary expression, » Malcolm means "an ex-
pression which is ordinarily used tc describe a certain sort of situation."2
He believes that "a self-contradictory expression would never be used to des-
cribe any sort of situation. "3 For Malcolm, the point of a Moore-like refu-
tation, showing that an expression dees have an ordinary use, is to prove
1) that the expression is not self-contradictory and 2) that therefore, the
^nxy ground for saying it is false must be empirical evidence. But 3) the
philosopher offers no empirical evidence. Thus, 4) the expression, as ordi-
nanly used, is true.
have snown that philosophers do offer empirical evidence. Also,
i.* sinpj.y does not ioxLovj that if indeed the philosopher is not saying that
the ordinary expression is self-contradictory, that his only ground for say-
^ - i false must oe empirical evidence. His grounds for saying it is
false may be a combination of purported necessary truths and empirical evi-
dence
,
Another reason for rejecting Malcolm’s position is that it is pa-
tently false or at least implausible. If Malcolm’s position is that the phi-
losopher is "really trying to toll us how people ordinarily use words," we may
-
Norman Malcolm, ’Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A, Schilpp,
opy cl't.
, p. 35^.
.IbicK, p. 358.
%ld. t p. 359.
Z, ,
Ibld«
, pp. 359-60.
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answsr, with Chisholm, that "obviously this is not the intention of the
statement."1 Lazerowitz sees Malcolm’s sort of interpretation as a spe-
cial form of Moore's paradox, namely that philosophers
have been able to hold sincerely, as part, of their philo-
sophical ci cel, views according to which expressions of
various sores, which they know arc used in ordinary dis-
course to describe real or imaginary states of affairs,
phave no use or sense.
Ibis would bo a paradox because the philosopher knows the expression has a
u^., j c. clams tuac io woes not. Malcolm's interpretation only moves the
paradox to another level.
Malcolm has an even stronger position that any philosophical state-
ment which violates ordinary language is false."’ The philosophical statement
is false no mattor what arguments may be advanced in favor of It!' Malcolm
believes that by pointing out that we often utter sentences of the form "I
know p for certain," where p is a material-thing statement, Moore has refuted
tho sceptic,"’ Moore never said or meant any such thing, but the question re-
mains whether this would be a good refutation.
The obvious rejoinder, which Malcolm acknowledges, is that at one
time everyone- said, e.g., that the earth is flat. Malcolm calls this a
"Roderick Chisholm, "Philosophy and Ordinary Language," Richard
Rorty, p o , p. 180.
386 ,
y
Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit. .
^Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
Op_._ Clt,
, p, 368.
if
Ibid
.
, p, 350.
^IbicL..» P* 35tff.
??.
mistake as to the empirical facts and distinguishes it from a misuse of lan-
guage. 1 But the example he gives of a misuse of language is a poor one be-
cause not analogous to the philosophical cases in question. His example is
that of too men confronting an animal (a fox), agreeing on the characteris-
tics of the animal and agreeing on what kind of animal is usually called a
for;. Presumably this means that they agree on what is usually denoted by
"fox.” But one of the men persists in calling the animal a wolf. 2 How, this
case is disanalogous to the philosophical cases because the intention of "fox”
is quite clear, there can be no disagreement. But we can easily imagine a
case more closely analogous to the philosophical cases. Take the man who
comes to Hew England and orders a milk shake. He is indignant when he finds
that his drink contains no ice cream. "This is no milk shake?" We feel that
thj.s man is not being absurd in the way that the man (above) who cries wolf
(literally) is being absurd, because there is a reason for disagreement about "Sr
intens ion of "milk shake.
Often the philosopher is very much like the traveler, coming from,
sav, the region of mathematics and visiting the region of science and common
sense. He finds that the locals claim to be certain of things for which no
mathematical sort of proof is possible. He tells them that they are wrong.
Now, if they inform him of the local customs, are they refuting him?
Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
PP. c it ,
,
p, 356.
?
TDid,, p. 337.
-'The man perhaps would be being absurd if, upon being informed about
local language customs, he persisted. He would be being absurd, or very provin-
cial.
73
Suppose tlio epistemologist does use the word "cer-
tau;' 1 incorrectly, he uses it, not as it is ordinarily
nsec., but, say, to refer to a type of cognition v.hioh
it would be logically impossible for any man to attain.
Clearly,
-./hen me have pointed this out, we have not re-
futed him. In all probability his statement v/hich for-
merly seer.ec] paradoxical now seems trivial.
. * Indeed y/e
non see, what v/e had not seen before, that what he is
saying is true
.
.
.
•
=
' " laiter a»s rs the- customer's "Eiis is not a milk hake"
v/ilh an explanation of the local usape it is 'because ho uncle
-stands that
in th B in -*10'*1 « e ' • : « ttttoe “nil s? ake," hat he ceil ,raS
true; the waiter 5. a not refuting the customer,
3 : should notefa that th : c< side
. tions k on! 3 ot lead to the
conclusion that ’'This is not a mill: shake," and «Uo are never certain that ma-
tenal-tmng statements are true," are necessary statements. Though, we nay
suspect teat the customer and the epistemologist arc both working on assump-
c.icno
.. -ice. ^ icy »ake to be necessarily true, ("kill: shakes contain ice
cream, " 'hi iu ms logicaliy possible that a statement is false, y/e are not
c • i’tain of it s truth. «
"
)
nose as umptions nay t lemseivos be false. And one would have to
agr__. wiu*t j.alcolm, at least in spirit. For, perhaps, the evidence we
" 3/3 Sivc For a statement’s being necessary nay be facts about usage,
uvfJ.j
,
tnere is always tie possibility that these assumptions are
n?0 being made, th: t indeed there is a disagreement about facts, that, e.g.,
Hoderac; C liso m, "Philosoj and Ordinary L; Richard
Forty, o-. , ckk
,
p. 177.
J
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tho drink has carbonation in it. The epistomologist may be using "cer-
tain"
-with its customary intension. If so he is not using language in-
correctly, but disagreeing with most people about a fact.^
In this chapter, I have examined two views that philosophical
statements are linguistic. 1 have attempted to show that Ambrose’s view
is mistaken and that malcolm's view is implausible. Malcolm’s view is
really only an application of Ambrose's view to philosophical statements
in general. Ambrose argues that necessary statements are linguistically
informative, and Malcolm argues that the statements of Moore and other
philosophers are to be included among necessary, linguistically informa-
tive statements, but x-ialcolm ’ s view is highly implausible ; it merely moves
Moore’s paradox to another level.
Roderick Chisholm, ’’Philosophy and Ordinary Language," Richard
Rorty, op. cit.
,
p. 1?6.
2
See Chisholm’s arguments against psychologism and linguistth-
eism: Theory of* Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, 13. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), ppf 79-83.”
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CHAPTER VIII
ARE PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS REALLY LINGUISTIC PROPOSALS?
Faced with the fact that philosophers like Bradley seem to
claim logical necessity for their statements, and the resulting second-
level paradox, mentioned above, that philosophers would then be holding
the view that expressions which they know to have a use, do not have a
use, Morris Lazerowitz concludes that philosophical statements are really
linguistic proposals, or verbal recommendations.
Only by preventing ''temporal fact" iron having a
descriptive use, by preventing any phenomenon, actual
or imaginable from being called a temporal fact, does
"There cannot oe any temporal facts " become an expres-
sion .for a necessary proposition, '
The philosopher’s argument "is meant to back a verbal recommendation. "2
Moore ’
s
defense of Common Sense is a defense against chang-
ing the language of Common Sense; and his refutations
are simply counter-proposals, to be understood as recom-
3
mendations not to follow academic wishes to alter it.
In fact, Moore’s "’refutations’ are not refutations," and the philoso-
phers’ views "have no refutations .
«
L
Laserowita 1 s view about what
P. 384
morris Lazerowitz
,
"Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, or>. cij
^Ibid a
, p, 391.
^Iblri
.
, p. 393.
4
Poid.
, p. 376.
philosophical statements rosily are clearly has different consequences
than Malcolm's view. Malcolm found the philosophers' statements to be
&!£ and Moore's refutations to be good ones. LaseroHiU's view seems
consistent with holding that philosophical statements simply do not have
a truth-value, and therefore neither are true nor have a refutation.
Ambrose holds the same, or a very similar, view. If Bradley’s
con.._.u.,ioru, are logically necessary, we can treat them "as having only
vereal import... as reflecting usage." But since "thing," etc. are not
"deprived by current convention of any function," Bradley’s arguments
must be "devices... for altering present language in a non-workaday
vay." In a "revised language,” his statements of existential denial
would express a necessity
.
2
I will attempt here, first, to clarify what is meant by "lin-
guistic proposal." There are various kinds of proposals or recommendations
which could be called "linguistic" or "verbal": for example, the proposal
that Esperanto be established as a universal language, or the recommenda-
tion of certain changes in the spelling or pronunciation of English, or the
suggestion that certain rules of grammar be dropped. The sort of proposal
wnuch Moore’s critics believe is being made by philosophers is the sort
which Cells lor changing (or, on Moore’s part, retaining) the meaning 02*
use Oj. a word (or words). Such a proposal could be made with regard to
intension, or denotation, or both.
7 ?
At V *ohe Pr°posal theorists say suggests that
they believe that philosophers are proposing changes merely in the denota-
tion of words
, changes merely in what the word is to apply to. Ambrose
says, '’Bradley.
. .stretch(cs) the use of 'appearance' to apply to what-
ever thing-, quality-
,
and relation-phrases normally apply to ...(Re is)
redrawing linguistic boundaries."1 similarly, Lazerowitz gives the de-
pression that he believes Bradley to be recommending that "temporal fact"
no lo^.^Oi apply to anything or that "now" no longer be used , ^ Malcolm
£ ays that Ayer explicitly suggests that "known for certain" is properly
applied only to a priori statements, 4 and that similarly a philosopher
who says that all words are vague is proposing, implicitly, that we &-
bolisn the use of "cmar
. The impression one receives from these state-
ments is that the philosopher is recommending a change in denotation, in
0
a
“ e '
-*-n wnich usage is established, without any corresponding change in
intension,
mis hieor;
,
if anyone hela it, would be a highly implausible
one. The philosopher's proposal would be like the proposal that "flat"
should apply so the earth* Is is unlikely that we should call such a pro-
posal a "linguistic proposal." And, if the philosopher were making such a
1 ,,,
p. 384.
Alice Ambrose, Assays in Analysis
.
p. 25-4.
A
Itorris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Sehilpp, op. cit,
,
M
3r P< 393.
'Norman Malcolm
,
p- 354.
h,Mw. P* 364.
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propose!, ho Jaald look very much like the man, in Kalcota's example, who
callin0 a fox a wolf for no apparent reason. Ho acknowledges
that "fox" means an animal which has characteristics v, w. and x; that
"wolf" means an animal which has characteristics x, y, and „ and that
the animal in question has characteristics v, w, and x. let he insists
on calling it a wolf. Could the philosopher be such an unreasonable fel-
low?
The answer is that he is not and that the proposal theorists
knc-w he is not. For despite the quotations above, one can also find
statements by Moore's critics which indicate that they believe the phi-
losopher is proposing a change in intention (as well as denotation).
Malcolm says, "The reason that the philosopher makes his paradoxical
statement... is that he is impressed by and wishes to emphasize a certain
similarity. ..This linguistic device of speaking paradoxically.
. .does of
course ignore the dissimilarities
.. .which .justify the distinction made
in ordinary language." it is as if the man who persists in calling a
To., a woli, does so Decause ho perceives the common characteristic, x; he
says, let us refer both to the animals which have characteristics v, w, x
and to those which have characteristics x, y, z by the term "wolf." But
in doing so he changes the intension of the word "wolf," which now means
an anima?. which either has characteristics v, w, x or x, y, z. And if x
is a characteristic unique to the class, volves-and-foxes
,
then he is
recommending that "wolf" both mean and apply to all animals which have
characteristic x.
Woman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. ochilpp,
op. cit., pp.
Or, perhaps it isn't merely this similarity which provokes the
mar, to say what he does, but the fact that he finds it difficult to dis-
tinguish wolves from foxes. He can well enough tell the difference bo- ,
twee, fox or wolf and a horse, but when it comes to foxes and wolves, they
all look pretty much the same to him. This is what Ambrose suggests is
the case with the philosopher. "It is the fact that there are no cri-
teria distinguishing sharply between veridical experience, illusion, hal-
lucination, aii dream experience which the sceptic uses to justify his
holding one can never know that hands, say, exist. Here, the philos-
opher seems to be proposing a change in the intension (as well as denota-
tion) of "know" because there is no sharp distinction between the cases in
whivii it doeo and does not apply. He may, for example, be proposing that
"knowing ' should imply the impossibility of being mistaken,
ihe most plausible view is that the philosopher is recommending
a change both in denotation and intension. But note that knowing the in-
tension of a word does not necessarily imply knowing its denotation. We
may know the intension of a word and not know whether or not it applies to
a particular entity. And a proposal may involve not a change in denota-
tion, but rather the extension of what a word denotes. Vie may know the
intension of "living, " or- "organic," and also know many facts about a cer-
tain microscopic entity, and yet not know whether these predicates apply,
whether they denote this entity. A proposal that they should denote this
entity would be a third sort of proposal. Moore takes tire case of two ani-
mals going around each other. Two men claim, respectively,
1. D vent around G.
2. G went around D.
^ Alice Ambrose
,
"Moore’s 'Proof of an External World,
Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit, , p. 413,
i i it
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Here usage is not established. The two men agree on the facts of the
case and presumably on the intension of "went aroand. " Moore believes that,
as it stands, "either usage is dWo, i.e. correct, but not definitely
correct, He also believes that the men "are not contradicting one another."
Sut they would be contradicting one another if each man meant that his usage
is definutwl^ corim^ &s if the visitor to hew England persisted in saying,
"That's not a milk shake,") and they would each be making a mistake. "They
night be recommending things" only if they meant "that it should in such
cases SS£& definitely correct to say" one or the other. 1 Such a recom-
mend a tier; wouxd call for an extension of denotation to include cases for which
there is no established usage. The proposal theorists, however, seem to be-
lieve that the philosopher's proposal is made in cases in which usage is es-
tablished. Otherwise Moore could not be said to refute the philosopher by
referring to tno established usage of ordinary language.^
But whatever sort of proposal tho philosopher may be said to be mak-
ing, the question remains whether the proposal is that men in their ordinary
discourse should adopt this change? Lazerowitz says
This.. .the philosopher undoubtedly docs not intend;...
It could be said that he is making an academic pro-
posal, for esoteric adoption only. But again, it seems
closer to the facts to describe what he does as making
or maintaining an actual though academic reclassification. 3
Commonplace Book
, pp. 196-201,
“See Chapter VII, B.
^Morris Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics
,
p. 104.
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Thus Lazerowitz concludes, "It Is to characterize the
(philosophical) theory as a proposal,"3
Lazerowits rejects his own proposal theory for straightforward
reasons. The philosopher uses '-the language of assertion, - he has no in-
t .e.ot in chci.ng.un- giamnar book.
,
and the reasons be gives for his con-
clusions are not of the sort usually given for a proposed change, 2
Lazerowitz rejects the proposal theory because it doesn’t quite fit the
facts. The purpose of the proposal theory is "to explain a number of
otherwise puzzling features" of philosophical theory, 3 namely, what La zero-
wils calxs "Moore ’s Paradox," and to explain the fact that, according to
Lazei'OWj. l,z and others, philosophical statements are neither empirical nor
necessary statements. Commenting on the proposal theory, Moore says, "The
last ’therefore’ seems to me to be a simply enormous non-sequitor l The
"therefore" he is talking about is the one of the proposal theorist's con-
clusion. The conclusion is meant as an explanatory theory, not logically
implied by the facts but, in some way, explaining them. The trouble with
this explanatory theory, as with many others
,
is that the explanation is
as puzzling and paradoxical as what it is supposed to explain. "Philo-
sophical statements are really linguistic proposals" has a paradoxical
ring very much like "Material objects are really collections of sense-
data , n
1
Morris Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics
, p. 3.03.
^Ibid
,
, p. 104.
3Ibid.
, p. 103.
4
"Reply to. his Critics," Paul A. Schilpp, op . cit., p. 675.
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Before considering other possible explanatory theories, I vlll
examine an argument which purports to show that if philosophical state-
ments or arguments are linguistic proposals (or reclassifications or
revisions), they are useless or improper. Malcolm notes that philsoph-
ioal statements often involve polar terms, i.e. pairs such as "large"
and "small," "animate" and "inanimate," "vague" and "clear." According
to Ma] col.:, philosophers often are proposing that we abolish the use of
one term of a pair. Thus, the philosopher who says that all words are
vague is proposing that we abolish the use of "clear." Malcolm responds
that by such a move, we would have gained nothing; now "vague" would have
to do double duty, but it could not because it would lack a contrary.
Withoa b i^s polar mate "vague" itself would be useless and it too would
be dropped.^
Malcolm s argument is bad because he misconceives what the phi-
losopher' o proposal would be, if indeed he were making one. First, he
seems to suggest that the philosopher is banishing "clear" altogether.
C. K. Grant responds; "Even if we accept 'All words are reallv vague, ’
all that follows is that we cannot use 'vague' and 'clear' to. qualify
words
; all the otner manifold uses of these polar terms remain unaffect-
ed." Similarly, the philosopher whom Malcolm might suggest is banish-
ing "know for certain, "cannot be successfully countered by Malcolm's ar-
gument as long as he reserves "know for certain" for at least some
Hlorman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
op_._ cit.
,
p. y3\-.
2
C. K« Grant, "Folar Concepts and Iletaphilosophical Arguments,"
in II. D. Lewis, ed., Clarity Is Lot Enough; (London: Allei : ' win, 1963),
p. 2f>C.
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statements. 1 Malcolm might answer, e.g. in the ease of "All wards are
vague," that, as regards words
.
the predicate "vague" becomes useless,
that as resards words it would have to do double duty and could not, for
th. fo r divination marked oy "vague" and "clear" when predicated of
words would be lost. Even if "vague" and "clear" be disallowed a use as
distinguishing predicates, distinguishing some words from others, it doe:
not follow that. Mvague" becomes useless.
ill indeed be useless for certain purposes
as a modo of distinguishing between or of idem-
'
tiffing particular kinds of things...but it does
iiot follow that such a predicate is useless for
all purposes. Predicates may be used to remind,
or to make a formal point or to reject a conceiv-
classlocation, as well as to distinguish and
2
identify.
If anything, the polar terms argument should lead us to the con-
clusion that philosophers are net making proposals. Wouldn't it be silly to
suggest that people no longer distinguish between vague words (or expres-
sions j and clear ones? The proposal theory was supposed to explain Moore's
Paradox, which in this case would be the fact that the philosopher while
making a proposal, does not abide by or subscribe to it. Moore delights
in pointing out places in which a philosopher who says that tine is unreal
n
'Roderick Chisholm, "Philosophy and Ordinary Language,"
Richard Forty, op - cit
,
f p. 181.
2 -
JohnPassmo.ro, "Arguments to Meaninglessness, Preluded Opposites
and Paradigm Cases," Richard Forty, ed,
,
op. cit.
, p. 189.
8^
goes about using words like "before- and "after," in ordinary contexts.
Similarly one can surmise that Ramsey would not object to someone's point-
ing out that a particular expression is crisp and clear. And these facts
are inconsistent with the theory that philosophers are proposing; changes
in ordinary language.
CHAPTER IX
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITERIA
85
Let me now review, in a general sort of way, the path which is
taken by tne critics who have been discussed in this part of the paper.
The critic's problem arises from Moore’s defense of common sense and proof
of an external world. The critic feels, perhaps, that traditional philo-
sophical views cannot be refuted in the way that Moore seems to go about
refuting them. He feels that something is going on beneath the surface
cl tne dialogue between Moore and traditional philosophers. So he launche
into an examination of philosophical statements, an examination which he
expoCu< v< ,„.j- issue in some sort ol theory about what philosophical s tate-
ments really are. He notes the sort of things which led Kant to say that
pnilos conical statements are synthetic a priori
. He has certain criteria
by which lO judge whetner statements are empirical or necessary statements
Since philosophical statements do not fit easily into either classification,
he feels that they are peculiar, he feels uneasy about them. Perhaps he
feels so uneasy that he concludes they are somehow not respectable
,
x
Per-
haps he feels that philosophical statements are deceptive, they are not
-•hat they seem to be. They appear to be empirical; but in reality they
are not, since they are not like other empirical statements, they are dis-
similar to other empirical statements in important respects. He concludes
that philosophical statements are not really empirical, they are really
something else. They are really such and such or such and such or such
cino c tic. i *
am thinking of the verificationist, although I have not dis-
cussed his view.
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Moore is reported to have said that "when a philosopher says that
really something is so we are warned that what he says is really so is not
so realty
.
1,1 The path which Moore’s critics take in examining philosoph-
ical statements clearly parallels the path most philosophical investiga-
te.. Tno crj.tac finds that philosophical statements do not fit
easily into a certain classification; or he is concerned that, to use Am-
broso ’ s VJCrds (°xxt of context), "there are no clear distinctions" between
philosophical and scientific statements, that there is the "possibility
of confusing" ' them. On the other hand, philosophical statements are in
some ways similar to another sort of statement, a linguistic proposal or
whatever. But nobody has ever recognized this similarity before. The way
-in which philosophical statements are argued for, the language in which they
are asserted, hides this similarity, it is a disguise
,
as it were. The cri-
tic concludes tnat, despite this disguise, philosophical statements are real-
iiZ --- 2-nguiSuic proposals , A o Quote Malcolm (out of context); "This lin-
guistic device of speaking paradoxically, which the philosopher adopts in
order to stress a similarity
,
does of course ignore the dissimilarities
. .
.
The critic’s conclusion turns out to be as paradoxical as other philosophical
statements. Cne is tempted to ask the proposal theorist, "Are you proposing
mac, from now on, we should cal 1 philosophical statements linguistic pro-
posals; are you making a linguistic proposal?" But he says now that he was
‘‘Paraphrased by John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," Richard
Rorty, po. cit.
, p. 104.
*Alice Ambrose, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, otm_ cit._, p. 413
3
'Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
op
,
cit._, p. 363 .
I
e?
exaggerating. When he said that philosophical statements are real^ lin-
guistic proposals, he did not mean that they mere linguistic proposals
really
.
Instead of attempting to disrobe philosophical theories, as it
w.--, l.t Us, a.rss, sun up their interesting peculiarities. Although
philosophers often appeal to both scientific and commonly known empirical
facts, they themselves have no laboratories, perform no experiments, and
can claim to no closer observation than other people. With the same em-
pirical facts available, philosophers may come to opposite conclusions;
philosophical disputes continue unresolved. While empirical facts and
scientific theories do tend to suggest, influence, and possibly discredit
philosophical theories, they do not clearly disprove such theories; no con-
sonsus is brought abort in nhil osonV-ioai +V° x pn->-Losopnicd± thought by empirical evidence, as
it j.s in science
.
(This is not to suggest that there is never general a~
greement on certain issues or, broadly speaking, acknowledged tendencies
or goals.) Clearly the philosopher ’s conclusion, when it is a generalisa-
tion, as it usually is, does not issue from a straightforward inductive ar-
gument.
A metaphysics is unlike a typical inventory in that philosophers
aro r.ot concerned with which items there are, but with, roughly speaking,
how to classify items, and with which types of items there are. Philoso-
phers arc often concerned with the most abstract and general of types of
items, or categories, and these typos, or categories, are peculiar (though
no '-' u.vn '.pie ) in that wnether an item belongs to one of these categories is
ci. ton an analytic matter (that a house is a thing, etc. is logically neces-
sary). If a philosopher subscribes to a particular classification, a state-
ment he might make to the effect that a certain item belongs to a certain
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category will sound very peculiar** i- -J- i
,
01 poinaps nonsensical, as will all
statements which cross the usual categories +w A11 v +i °0
'
though to varying degrees.
Many philosophers examine concepts end words in arguing for
their conclusions. Soce philosophers seen to believe that their con-
^Iwsions are logically nece^ (-l.,, i
“
‘
"
» though m s ome cases this would be
inconsistent with other assertions which these philosophers mete (about
appearance). Necessary statements do often appear in philosophical argu-
ments, and a case can be made that seme philosophical conclusions are
necessary statements. But perhaps the most noteworthy fact about philo-
sophical statements is that often the words which appear in them are used
in unordinary ways.
The pnilosopner f s unordinary ways of speaking are now notori-
°a°’ The fact that ths Philosopher uses words in unordinary ways is per-
haps the primary datum which suggests the various metaphilosophical theses
ve have been considering. But, as Chisholm points cut, from the fact that
people use words differently, it does not follow that they have different
be„j_*.fs cbouc i.iia
.. is correct language
,
^ or what should be correct lan-
guage. b-ay, then, do philosophers use words in an unusual way? This ques-
tion does not have one answer but many. There are many unordinary ways in
whiCi, words can do used, not only in philosophy, but also in poetry and in
science.. In Philosophy and science, special terminology is often employed.
<..i e various purposes for special terminology and also various motives
that a philosopher or a scientist may have for employing such terminology,
I cannot hors attempt to give a full account of what is peculiar about philo-
sopnieal uses of terminology. But there is one way of describing the
Roderick Chisholm, "Philosophy and Ordinary Language,"
Richard Rorty, op . cit
.
, p. 179.
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philosopher's ^ordinary use of ordinary words which is especially apt for
Clarifying the relationship between Hoore and the traditional philosopher.
W9 may 8sy that tho philosopher often uses words in unordinary
y ca.. h. is eiTip.roaQ.ng special philosophical criteria. Often, tra-
ditional philosophers are rebuked for using words in unordinary ways.
Passmore says, "It is as if an economist were to be rebuked for overlooking
the fact that a person can 'demand' something which he has no means of pay-
ing for." He believes that most philosophical statements are of the critori-
ologscal sort, that "they are emphatic ways of pointing out that particular
philcsop.. si cissoria o, solidity, certainty, clarity are never in fact
.i.ii.d. If a philosopher says that we do not know material-thing state-
ments for certain, we car, paraphrase him: the evidence which we have for ma-
terial-thing statements doss not meet such and such a criterion for certain
knowledge
.
Setting special criteria for knowledge is similar to proposing a
new meaning for "know, " but they are not the same thing, letting a criterion
ior. Knowledge is specifying a standard by which to judge whether any item is
or 3.s not an item of knowledge. When we set up such a standard, it is likely
we oesire that others accept and employ our standard, or criterion.
Philosopnsrs rarely explicitly propose that others accept their criteria.
In fact, m some cases, they may not say or even be aware that they are cm-
pj.0y2.ng special criteria. But if they are aware that they are using special
criteria
,
they nay expect other philosophers to examine those things which
they considered and which influenced then to accept their criteria and to
’John Passmore, "Arguments to Meaninglessness, Excluded Opposites
and Paradigm Cases," Richard Rorty, on. cit , t p. 189.
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cxeiaine these problems which arise when other criteria are employed. 1
One may attempt to "reduce' 1 a criteriological statement to some sort of
statement about language. But such a reduction statement m?y itself be
reduced to a criteriological statement. Reduction statements are often
of the lorn: "a is really Y." But this statement may bo "reduced" to:
X meets such and. such criteria for something's being Y."
ihe reasons lor holding or accepting a particular criterion
are various
corned with
ations
.
in <- trai
,
The empirical facts which philosophers are con~
are very often facts about abnormal, atypical, or novel situ-
Consideration of atypical cases often points up
possible inadequacies and may suggest improvements in
our conceptualization of the "normal" cases. By far the
greater number of important and interesting traditional
philosophical problems ... have arisen out of these non-
paradigmatic cases which are either the re sults of sci-
entific dis covers or of speculation along scientific
lines ,
^
Clearly, empirical facts do not dictate a criterion. The fact that people
suffer hallucination suggests the possibility of being mistaken about
material-thing statements despite the usual immediate evidence. This
Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge
, pp. 5S--69, for
a general discussion of the problem ofth? criterion.
2
"Grover Maxwell) arri Herbert Feig'l, "V/hy Ordinary Language Leeds
Reforming," Richard Rorty, op, cit.
, pp. 195-6.
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similarity of: typical and atypical experience may suggest a stiff cri-
terion of knowledge; and these facts also show that according to a
stiff criterion, v;e cannot be said to know material-thing statements.
On another level, there may be various sorts of motives which
incline a philosopher toward a criterion. He may conceive his enter-
prise to be one of saving morality in the face of scientific claims, 1
or constructing a conceptual underpinning for the sciences, 2 or work-
ing cut the philosophical consequences of religious dogma, 5 or indicat-
ing, without use of dogma, the existence of God, 4 or pointing toward a
method for the salvation of mankind, 5
-- or defending common sense against
philosophical attack.
finally, on other levels, the philosopher’s work may be sympto-
matic of subconscious tendencies, political leaning, and religious up-
bi
-.n^a.ng
.
"
nG philosopher’s work is not immune from psychological, socio-
logies, biographical, and historical analysis. It is reasonable to be-
lievu tha o the philosopher ’s work is more open to such analysis than is
the scientist’s.
3uo, in general, philosophy books differ from other books in
that special criteria are employed for deciding whether or not items
1 ^
'See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Mew York: Barnes and
noole, Inc., liltf, pp» ^ e>—S 2 •
p
'Like Quine.
•3
''Note Anselm’s conception of his proof as a sort of conceptual
under-pinning for faith.
4
Like Berkley, Bradley, Jaspers and others.
5Like Marx.
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belong to the most general and sometimes abstract categories. The cri-
terion for something's being a material object may be that its appear-
ance is qualitatively different from a delusive or illusory appearance;
thus, certain items are said not to be material objects. The criterion
for something's being an event may be that events take place within its
parts
; items which are usually categorized as material objects are thus
categorized as events, or perhaps constructs of events. The criterion
for something's being known with certainty may be that the thing can be
provea ; items such as that there are hands may not be provable in a pres-
cribed manner. They are not categorized as known with certainty. And
philosophers may also have special criteria for items being identical,
real, good, and so on,
Th 1- oi iteio.olcgical me ^philosophical thesis has two important
virtues. First, it helps explain why philosophical disputes continue
through the ages. If philosophers are using different criteria, their
disputes about whether items are of a certain type cannot be resolved by
reference l,o empirical facts. Secondly, this thesis has the virtue of
solving hoore ' s paradox without raising a new one. Philosophers are not
men holding inconsistent beliefs but rather men using different criteria
at different times. One set of criteria is deemed sufficient for ordinary
life and another necessary for philosophical purposes. One set of criteria
is used in practice, the other in theory, Moore’s insight is that such a
dualism can be done without. The criteriological metaphilosophical thesis
suggests itself as at least the most handy one with which to both account
for traditional philosophy and illuminate Moore’s special contribution to
philosophy.
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I do noo here wish to get into a long discussion on the virtues
and vices of traditional philosophy. It is now almost a truism that the
form philosophical statements take is often misleading as to their pur-
port. In "Philosophical Perplexity," Wisdom attempts to give a short
account of the ways in which philosophy can be misleading. 1 Yet in "Moore's
Technique" he asks,
"V-lch oi the net that on the covers of their books
they print the warning "Philosophy" and that so many
of them inside misuse language like this, is it a mis-
use? 2
Wisdom answers (obliquely) concerning statements which seem but, according
to him, do not go against common sense:
It’s middling to express oneself this way and. it may
temporarily confuse others and even oneself into sus-
pecting those everyday remarks ,. .It’s muddling, but it’s
3
natural
.
That philosophers often convince themselves that they have proved astound-
ing theses is well documented in the literature. One example which both
Moore and Wisdom give is this statement of McTaggart's: "Jo Matter is in
f,
the same position as the gorgons and the harpies , |:‘-
1
John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity, " Richard Eorty,
on., cit,., lOkff.
2
John Wisdom, "Moore's Technique," Paul A. Schilop
,
_ou. cit.,
p. *35.
3Ibld,
, p. 438.
HeTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, Second Edition, p. 95»
94
We naturally, with Moore, gasp at such a statement. We feel
tnat Moore must be right in saying that at least sometimes some philos-
ophers have meant their statements to be paradoxical, to go against com-
mon sense. Yet we nod to Wittgenstein's reaction upon hearing Moore's
proof of an external world: "Those philosophers who have denied the
existence, of Matter have not wished to deny that under my trousers I
wear part:
. The rhetorical device of emphasising what you are saying
with striking remarks ' oversteps the boundaries of sober discourse when
it reaches the heights (or depths) illustrated by McTaggart’s statement.
Yet most traditional philosophical theories can be put in language more
sober, though less exciting, than has been the practice.
Thus, Moore's defense of common sense is a good defense in the
sense that what he says seems true. Some philosophers have meant to con-
found common sense, or thought that this is what they were doing. The be
lief that there are material objects, they have suggested, Is a common er
ror. Or they have suggested that the belief that we know that there are
material objects is a common error. They have given, or have been under,
impression that their criteria for an item being known or for an item be-
ing a material object are the same as the ordinary criteria. Or while
being aware at some times that their- criteria are especially stiff, they
have ignored this fact at other times. Alternately, we can say that they
have used words in unordinary ways. They were not therefore recommending
usages nor were they recommending criteria. Often, whether unaware of or
^Reported by John Wisdom, "Moore's Technique," Paul A. Schilpp,
op, cit,
, p. 431.
2
See John Passmore, "Arguments to Meaninglessness
,
Excluded
Opposites, and Paradigm Cases," Richard Rorty, op. cit., p. I89 .
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ignoring the fact that their criteria are net the criteria of common
-oi sc (or alternately that their language is not the language of ordi-
nary usage), they have asserted, e.g., do notknow that there are ,„a-
terial objects, 11 in the sense which Moore calls ordinary, in the sense:
ve humans we do not have good evidence that there are hands, soap bub-
bles, and telephone poles. Patently, according to the ordinary criteria
™ do have good evidence that these things exist. When Moore shows his
-a., n«, gives good evidence. Moore, though, goes a step further, in say-
ing than we even have the sort of evidence which the traditional philos-
pher demands, although he acknowledges that he cannot give this evidence.
3ti.t!
,
he stands by ordinary criteria in claiming that we can know things
" ©
which we cannot prove.
But what has Moore to say to those philosophers— or to philos-
ophers in their more sober moments
-who do not mean to deny the existence
of Wittgenstein’s pants. Explicitly, he says that they are misusing lan-
guage or- tha- taere is no good reason to accept their theses, or that they
are really offering analyses which he cannot accept. But implicitly, he
has something of much more iiupo^nce (I thin!.:) to say. Implicitly, Poore's
career is a defense of the ordinary criteria. It is not that he is defend-
ing those criteria against attempts to have then changed. It is that he
is defending those criteria as philosophically relevant. He is ex- iplify-
uhe lac o teat or.e can do good philosophy with those criteria and there-
fcg sho.vj.ng chat we have no good reason to be suspicious of common sense
oo-iiufs in general, or of the knowledge which we ordinarily claim to have
about our environment. Of all the critics in the Schilpp volume, Murphy
seems to have the best grasp of what Moore is about when he says,
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tno kind oX understanding and knowing so far defended
are precisely the sort which a philosophically compre-
hensive estimate of the world we live in and our ways
c>x i -biding oul. about it should have led us to exoect
in this situation. Such knowing does not conform to
the pattern of clarity and certainty which a philoso-
pnen- indent on reducing the world to logic or analys-
ing it into sensation would require, but it is wholly
arbitrary and unreasonable to demand that it should.
Ana while it is not "final" as satisfying the epis-
temologist’s or metaphysician’s aspirations, it is
quii-e "ultimate" as a source of reliable and in some
cases certainly truthful information not otherwise
procurable about the world around us... Thus in defend-
ing common sense against its critics and exhibiting
once more its primacy and authentic cogency, Moore has
made an Important contribution to philosophical good
sense,*
The great conflict between philosophy and common sense which Moore
pictured as being largely a matter of disagreement on substantial issues is
really largely a criteriological split, We might call it philosophical
schizophrenia. It is misleading to suggest that philosophers have had con-
tradictory beliefs about proper usage. Rather they have measured beliefs
by different standards, one for the streets, and another for the study.
Thus, they can say, yes, according to the ordinary criteria I know that I
^Arthur Murphy, "Moore’s
ochilpp, op. cit
.
,
pp. 31^ 1 -315 .
’Defence of Common Sense,'" Paul A.
9?
have a hand, but according to the philosophical criteria, alas, 1 do not
know that material objects are real. It may be that some philosophers
haVG held contradictory beliefs about which are the correct criteria.
It scorns to me that for the most part they have believed that their philo-
sophical criteria are correct, their ordinary criteria incorrect though
useful in everyday intercourse and perhaps inevitable. Hume retreats
frotc the "delirium” of philosophy to friendly merriment and conversation
wherein he finds himself determined to live, talk, and act like other peo-
ple in the common •affairs of life. But he returns to philosophy thereby
reaffirmed in his sceptical principles. It is not that he has different
beliefs about correct usage or correct criteria, but that he uses dif-
ferent criteria, one set for the "cold and strain’d" speculation of philos-
op-
‘J t a no uher ror seo±a^_ merriment and amusement. VJhat .loore has shown is
that this philosophical schizophrenia is not inevitable, that philosophy
and common sense can live together in harmony, and that for the sake of
intellectual peace (and clarity), they should.
98
bibliography
Ambrose, Alice. Essays in Analysis. Mew York: Humanities Fress,
Austin, J. L. 2^2. g^ |onsibilfa. Edited by G. J. Waraook. Ko» York-Oxford University Press, 1964.
Austin, J. L. mi&sw&S&k Pagers. E-dited by J. (). Urns on and G. J.Warnock. London; Oxford University Press, 196l 0
^ex‘» A * J * Truth and Lc^ic. Victor Gollancz; U.3.A.: Dover
Publication, 1946,
Blsxe, Kaipn n, "can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended,” Philosophical
Review, LIT (1943).
Chisholm, Roderick H. Theory of Knowledge
. Englewood Cliffs, N.J •
Prentice-Hall, i960.
Hume, David. Treatise of Human Haturn
. Edited by Sir L. A. Selby-Biggo.
London; Oxford University Press, 1962.
Lazerowitz, Morris. Studies in Metaphilosoohy. London: Routlcdee and
Kegan Paul, 19<4.
" ' ~~ “
Lazerowitz, Morris. The Structure of Metaphysics. London: Routledge and
Keg.an Paul, 1955*
Lewis, H. D. (ed.). Clarity is not Enough , London: Allen 2: u'nv/in, 1963.
Malcolm, Homan. ’’Defending Common Sense," Philosophical Review, LVIII
( 1949 ).
Malcolm, Homan. "Philosophy and Ordinary Language” (mistakenly titled
’’Philosophy for Philosophers"), Philosophical Review, LX (1951).
Moore, G, E« Commonplace Book
,
Edited by Casimer Lowy. New York: The
Macmillan Co., I962T
Moore, G. E. Lectures on Philosophy . Edited by Casimer Lewy. Mew York:
Humanities Press, Inc., 1966.
Moore, G
Moore
. E. Philosophical Papers . Mew York: Collier Books, I962.
G. E. Some Main Problems of Philosophy . New York: Collier Books,
I962.
*
Quine
,
Willard Van Orman. From a Logical Point of View . New York: Harper
md Row, 1963.
99
Rorty, Richard (ed ) t*
n , .
' *'* Linguists r> Tiiv..-, Pv .Cmcago Press, 1967
.
~ ^nieago, University of’
Ryle, Gilbert, The Concent of Kind v .
1?‘:9. :ew York: Barnes and Kobla
, I„0
.
,
Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed,). fhp Philosophy of , ENorthwestern University ~~~ ^ Fasten:
’ J
‘l956.
SSl2a2SaiS2i London: Oxford University Press,
K!US
' A
'
^nhks^ A teSSsmS* Oxford: Basil Blacic-
VH-ttgenstein, Ludwig. Tractates Lovic„-PMw
D. F, Pears Translated by
1961.
* Fl' jUlnness
* Ne« York: Humanities ihess,
COMMON SENSE AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE
A Thesis
by
Ronald Isaac Rothbart
Approved by;
Kay 23, 196-3

RULE CO. 1
